Even If landlord has multiple premises available with him still the tenant cannot dictate to him which of the premises he may seek to get vacated

Tenant can be evicted for bona fide requirement of married daughter of landlord even if such daughter or her husband is having resources to purchase other premisses

    In another decision rendered by a single Judge of our High Court in Vinod Gupta vs. Kailash Aggarwal & Ors. where the bona- fidé requirement of a married daughter was canvassed, the single Judge relying upon the decision in Sunder Singh Talwar (supra) has also referred to a 2014 decision as follows :

"14. Further in Rajender Prasad Gupta V. Rajeev Gagerna 2014 (114) DRJ 182, the Court held as follows :
"5. Having considered the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that the Trial Court has taken into consideration each of the contentions raised in the leave-to-defend and found them to be not triable issues. The reasons for and conclusion arrived at cannot be faulted. Furthermore, simply because the daughter of a marriageable age and allegedly likely to marry would not necessary cut her ties from her maternal family nor would the requirement for her accommodation in her father's house be lessened. Indeed, in the present times a daughter who is married-out, may like to retain her accommodation in her father's house which forms an emotional anchor and a place for refuge for all times. In times of an unfortunate marital discord such need becomes more acute should there be such a need.
    Conversely her family also would want to retain a room so as to re-assure her of a continued place of residence in her paternal home. A married daughter's ties with her paternal family do not end upon her marriage. For a married daughter her parents' home is always a refuge; an abode of reassurance and an abiding source of emotional strength and happiness. In the present case the daughter is a practicing advocate, i.e. a qualified professional, the need is all the more acute and bona fide. This Court finds, as did the Trial Court did, that no triable issues were raised in the leave-to- defend. Therefore, there was no need to grant leave or set the matter for trial. The reasons and the conclusion arrived at in the impugned order are correct and call for no interference." 

"15. Thus the law discussed above does not leave any room for further discussion on this topic. Admittedly the law as it stands, the daughters share equal rights in their parental properties as a son does, hence saying a married daughter severe (sic) all her relations with her father's family and would never be considered dependent upon the family's property, residential or commercial, that her parents own, would not be correct. Hence no fault can be found in impugned order even on this score."

(emphasis supplied) The single Judge thereby upheld the denial of leave-to-defend to the tenant.[Para No.16]

    While the ARC has clearly erred in holding that the requirement of a married daughter can never be considered while deciding the bona-fidé requirement of a landlord under section 14(1)(e) since a married daughter does not remain a member of the family, another question arises in the present case, and that is : whether in assessing the availability of suitable, alternate accommodation for the use of a married daughter, it is necessary to first assess the availability of such accommodation in the hands of the husband ; or is it permissible to assess the availability of such accommodation in the hands of the maternal family of the married daughter. In the opinion of this court, this question must be answered from the perspective of the eviction petitioner who seeks recovery of possession for the bona fidé requirement of a dependent family member. Accordingly, the availability of suitable, alternate accommodation is to be seen in the hands of the person filing the eviction petition, in this case the mother/landlady; and it is not relevant whether other relatives of the dependant family member have any alternate accommodation available. In this case, it is therefore not relevant whether the petitioner's sons-in-law have alternate accommodation or not.[Para No.17]

U/s. 62 of The Indian Evidence Act, carbon copies can be taken into consideration as primary evidence

Briefly stated case of the prosecution is that the respondent was running a medical shop viz., M/s. Sri Balaji Medicals. On the directions issued by the Assistant Director of Drugs Control, Salem Zone, the Drugs Inspectors had inspected the respondent's medical shop on 17.12.2008. In the course of inspection, it was found that certain drugs were stored without a valid drug licence and the same were seized. A memo dated 22.12.2008 had been issued to the respondent-accused alleging contravention of section 18(c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The respondent had caused reply (Ex.-P4) to the said memo without furnishing details of purchase. The Drug Inspector has fled a charge sheet against the respondent informing commission of offence punishable under Sections 27(b) (ii) and 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Upon consideration of evidence, the trial court after referring to Ex.-P4 held that the respondent has admitted that he has no licence to the premises for sale of drugs. The trial court further held that Exs.P-4 to P-7 though were carbon copies, as per section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act, they can also be considered as primary evidence. On those findings to, the trial court convicted the respondent and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and imposed fne of Rs. 5000/- under Section 27(b)(ii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and fne of Rs. 500/- under section 28 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Aggrieved by the verdict of conviction and the sentence of imprisonment, respondent-accused preferred an appeal in Criminal Appeal No.18 of 2013 before the appellate court-Principal Sessions Judge, Krishnagiri which was dismissed vide order dated 29.08.2013.[Para No.3]

    Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove that the respondent is the owner of M/s Sri Balaji Medicals and the non-examination of Kamalakannan and Jayanthi was fatal to the prosecution case. Learned counsel further submitted that the alleged statement of the respondent in Exs.P-4, P-7 and P-10 relied upon by the prosecution were only carbon copies and the courts below could not have based the conviction upon Exs.P-4, P-7 and P-10 and that the High Court has rightly reversed the same.[Para No.6]

    Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that Exs.P-4 and P-7, that is, the statements of respondent were only carbon copies and that admission of such carbon copies raises serious doubt about the prosecution case. As pointed out by the trial court as well as by the first appellate court, under section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act, carbon copies can be taken into consideration primary evidence and we find no infirmity in admitting carbon copies of those documents.[Para No.14]