03 January 2021
Court must give reasoning as to why it has accepted the contentions of one party and rejected those of other party
31 December 2020
Relatives of the Muslim husband cannot be accused of the offence of pronouncement of triple talaq; the offence can only be committed by a Muslim man
Sec. 7(c) of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019 does not impose an absolute bar on granting regular or anticipatory bail
27 December 2020
filing of a first information report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438 of Cr.P.C.
(i) Grant of an order of unconditional anticipatory bail would be “plainly contrary to the very terms of Section 438.” Even though the terms of Section 438(1) confer discretion, Section 438(2) “confers on the court the power to include such conditions in the direction as it may think fit in the light of the facts of the particular case, including the conditions mentioned in clauses (i) to (iv) of that sub-section.”
(ii) Grant of an order under Section 438(1) does not per se hamper investigation of an offence; Section 438(1)(i) and (ii) enjoin that an accused/applicant should co-operate with investigation. Sibbia (supra) also stated that courts can fashion appropriate conditions governing bail, as well. One condition can be that if the police make out a case of likely recovery of objects or discovery of facts under Section 27 (of the Evidence Act, 1872), the accused may be taken into custody. Given that there is no formal method prescribed by Section 46 of the Code if recovery is made during a statement (to the police) and pursuant to the accused volunteering the fact, it would be a case of recovery during “deemed arrest” (Para 19 of Sibbia).
(iii)
(iv) While the power of granting anticipatory bail is not ordinary, at the same time, its use is not confined to exceptional cases (Para 22, Sibbia).
(v) It is not justified to require courts to only grant anticipatory bail in special cases made out by accused, since the power is extraordinary, or that several considerations – spelt out in Section 437- or other considerations, are to be kept in mind. (Para 24-25, Sibbia).
(vi) Overgenerous introduction (or reading into) of constraints on the power to grant anticipatory bail would render it Constitutionally vulnerable. Since fair procedure is part of Article 21, the court should not throw the provision (i.e. Section 438) open to challenge “by reading words in it which are not to be found therein.” (Para 26).
(vii) There is no “inexorable rule” that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the applicant is the target of mala fides. There are several relevant considerations to be factored in, by the court, while considering whether to grant or refuse anticipatory bail. Nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the accused’s presence not being secured during trial; a reasonable apprehension that the witnesses might be tampered with, and “the larger interests of the public or the state” are some of the considerations.
(viii) There can be no presumption that any class of accused- i.e. those accused of particular crimes, or those belonging to the poorer sections, are likely to abscond. (Para 32, Sibbia).
(ix) Courts should exercise their discretion while considering applications for anticipatory bail (as they do in the case of bail). It would be unwise to divest or limit their discretion by prescribing “inflexible rules of general application.”. (Para 33, Sibbia).
(x) The apprehension of an applicant, who seeks anticipatory bail (about his imminent or possible arrest) should be based on reasonable grounds, and rooted on objective facts or materials, capable of examination and evaluation, by the court, and not based on vague un-spelt apprehensions. (Para 35, Sibbia).
(xi)
(xii)
(xiii) Anticipatory bail can be granted even after filing of an FIR- as long as the applicant is not arrested. However, after arrest, an application for anticipatory bail is not maintainable. (Para 38-39, Sibbia).
24 December 2020
Separate F.I.R. can be lodged by every depositor if they are cheated on different dates
Each instance of cheating of every investor/depositor would constitute an independent offence even if it is committed as a part of single conspiracy
Victims are entitled to claim compensation for incidents that occurred even prior to the coming into force of section 357A(4) of Cr.P.C.
22 December 2020
When police refused to register F.I.R. the complainant must approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of CrPC and not to the High Court directly
Subordinate to the appointing authority can not grant sanction to prosecute
Additional Collector holding charge of District Collector can not give sanction to prosecute in corruption case when employee is appointed by District Collector
17 December 2020
Under the grab of Public Interest Litigation a Third party can not file application u/s. 482 of Cr.P.C.
05 December 2020
Accused in cheque bounce case cannot take benefit if complainant has not shown the transaction in Income-Tax returns
"Further, it has been observed thatthere is no provision in Income-Tax Act, which makes an amount not shown in the income- tax returns unrecoverable. If some amounts are not accounted for, the person would be visited with the penalty or at times even prosecution under Income-Tax Act, but it does not mean that the borrower can refuse to pay the amount which he has borrowed simply, because there is some infraction of the provisions of the Income-Tax Act." [Para No.12]
"The object of introducing S. 269 is to ensure that a tax payer is not allowed to give false explanation for his unaccounted money, or if he has given some false entries in his accounts, he shall not escape by giving false explanation for the same. During search and seizure unaccounted money is unearthed and the tax payer would usually give the explanation that he had borrowed or received deposits from his relatives or friends sand it is easy for the so-called lender also to manipulate his records later to suit the plea of the tax-payer. The main object of S. 269-SS was to curb this menace."[Para No.13]
29 November 2020
Investigation and filling of chargesheet under The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 should be done only by Special Police Officer empowered under Section 13 of the Act
"4. There is also yet another aspect that is required to be looked into. Under S.13 of the Act, a Special Police Officer shall be appointed 'for dealing with the offences under this Act in that area'. 'Dealing with the case' means doing everything connected with the progress of the case. The Supreme Court in the decision referred supra considered that question and held that the expression would include detection, prevention and investigation of offences and other duties which have been specifically imposed on the Special Police Officer under the Act. It is seen from the records that investigation of the case was conducted by the Circle Inspector though, as authorised by the Special Police Officer and the role of the Special Police Officer was only to verify the investigation and submit final report.S.14(ii) of the Act does not empower the Special Police Officer to authorise investigation of the case to be conducted by any other officer. If that be so the investigation conducted by the officer other than the Special Police Officer is against the provisions of law. "[Para No.8]