Showing posts with label criminal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label criminal. Show all posts

05 December 2020

Accused in cheque bounce case cannot take benefit if complainant has not shown the transaction in Income-Tax returns

Now it has been harped upon by the accused that the said transaction has not been accounted for. In other words, complainant has not shown the said transaction in her Income-Tax returns. Learned Advocate for the respondent as well as learned Trial Court have heavily relied on the decision in Sanjay Mishra (supra). However, it appears that the legal position that had developed thereafter was not pointed out to learned Trial Judge. In Bipin Thakkar (supra) entire legal position on this point has been discussed. In fact, Bipin Thakkar (supra) reiterates the law discussed on the point in Krishna P. Morajkar vs. Joe Ferrao and another [2013 ALL MR (Cri) 4129 : (2013) 5 AIR Bom R 294]. It is necessary to reproduce those observations from Krishna's case, which reads thus :-
"Further, it has been observed that there is no provision in Income-Tax Act, which makes an amount not shown in the income- tax returns unrecoverable. If some amounts are not accounted for, the person would be visited with the penalty or at times even prosecution under Income-Tax Act, but it does not mean that the borrower can refuse to pay the amount which he has borrowed simply, because there is some infraction of the provisions of the Income-Tax Act."[Para No.12]

    Thus, when in a subsequent pronouncements this Court has clarified the legal position that too, after taking note of subsequent pronouncement by Hon'ble Supreme Court,
Accused in cheque bounce case cannot take benefit if complainant has not shown the transaction in Income-Tax returns
then the later decision would prevail. It has been then observed in Bipin Thakkars' case that, "It is true that merely because amount advanced is not shown in Income-Tax return, in every case, one cannot jump to the conclusion that the presumption under Section 139 of said Act stands rebutted". We can consider the decision in the case of Assistant Director of Inspection vs. A. B. Shanthi, (2002) 6 SCC 259, wherein it has been held :-
"The object of introducing S. 269 is to ensure that a tax payer is not allowed to give false explanation for his unaccounted money, or if he has given some false entries in his accounts, he shall not escape by giving false explanation for the same. During search and seizure unaccounted money is unearthed and the tax payer would usually give the explanation that he had borrowed or received deposits from his relatives or friends sand it is easy for the so-called lender also to manipulate his records later to suit the plea of the tax-payer. The main object of S. 269-SS was to curb this menace."[Para No.13]

29 November 2020

Investigation and filling of chargesheet under The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 should be done only by Special Police Officer empowered under Section 13 of the Act

Learned counsel also took my attention to Joseph v. State of Kerala [2011 (2) KHC 958]. In that decision, while dealing with Sections 3, 4, 5, 14 (ii) of the Act, it has been held that authorisation given by the Special Police Officer to his subordinate officer must mention the name of any of the persons to be arrested. It is also held that Special Police Officer cannot authorise investigation of the case to be conducted by any other officer. In paragraph No.4 of the said judgment, the ambit and scope of Section 13 has been dealt with, which is relevant in this context to be extracted and it reads as follows:
"4. There is also yet another aspect that is required to be looked into. Under S.13 of the Act, a Special Police Officer shall be appointed 'for dealing with the offences under this Act in that area'. 'Dealing with the case' means doing everything connected with the progress of the case. The Supreme Court in the decision referred supra considered that question and held that the expression would include detection, prevention and investigation of offences and other duties which have been specifically imposed on the Special Police Officer under the Act. It is seen from the records that investigation of the case was conducted by the Circle Inspector though, as authorised by the Special Police Officer and the role of the Special Police Officer was only to verify the investigation and submit final report. S.14(ii) of the Act does not empower the Special  
Investigation and filling of chargesheet under The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 should be done only by Special Police Officer empowered under Section 13 of the Act
Police Officer to authorise investigation of the case to be conducted by any other officer. If that be so the investigation conducted by the officer other than the Special Police Officer is against the provisions of law.
"[Para No.8]

22 November 2020

In an inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is required to consider whether the civil dispute is tried to be given a colour of criminal dispute or not

Now so far as the reliance placed on the decision of this Court in the case of National Bank of Oman vs. Barakara Abdul Aziz (Supra) relied upon by the Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the complainant is concerned, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the said decision shall not be of any assistance to the complainant.
In an inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is required to consider whether the civil dispute is tried to be given a colour of criminal dispute or not
It cannot be disputed that while holding the inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. the Magistrate is required to take a broad view and a prima facie case. However, even while conducting/holding an inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is required to consider whether even a prima facie case is made out or not and whether the criminal proceedings initiated are an abuse of process of law or the Court or not and/or whether the dispute is purely of a civil nature or not and/or whether the civil dispute is tried to be given a colour of criminal dispute or not. As observed hereinabove, the dispute between the parties can be said to be purely of a civil nature. Therefore, this is a fit case to quash and set aside the impugned criminal proceedings. [Para No.6.5]

17 November 2020

Magistrate; after taking cognizance, cannot issue, at the first instance, non bailable arrest warrant against accused who has obtained anticipatory bail

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners were granted anticipatory bail by this Court in the FIR registered against them bearing No.3/2003 at Police Station Khetri, District Jhunjhunu under Section(s) 418, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 406 & 120-B IPC. The police submitted a Final Report whereafter protest petition was filed, which was dismissed.
    Against the dismissal order of the protest petition, a revision petition was filed, which was allowed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khetri and the matter was remanded back to the Court to pass a fresh order on 18.7.2018, whereafter the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance on 11.1.2019 and summoned the petitioners through arrest warrants. The said order of remand was challenged by the petitioners before the High Court and the High Court had stayed the said proceedings. Taking into consideration the order of taking cognizance, the petition was declared infructuous.[Para No.1]

    Learned Magistrate thereafter again issued arrest warrants.[Para No.2]
......

    For the aforesaid backdrop, this Court notices that it is a case where on remand from the District Judge, the Court has taken cognizance of the offences relating to allegations under Sections 418, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 406 & 120-B IPC. The High Court vide its order dated 29.4.2003 had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioners with the condition that in the event of arresting the petitioners, they shall be released on bail.
    
    Keeping in view the conditions laid down in Sushila Agarwal & Others (supra), this Court is of the firm view that
Magistrate; after taking cognizance, cannot issue, at the first instance, non bailable arrest warrants against accused who has obtained anticipatory bail
the action of the learned Magistrate from the date, it has taken cognizance and upto passing of the impugned order dated 3.9.2020 has acted in clear violation of the orders passed by the High Court after having granted anticipatory bail. There was no occasion for the learned Magistrate to have issued the arrest warrants and such course or power was not available with it in spite of having been given to it.

15 November 2020

Absence of proof of motive creates a doubt regarding the mens rea entitling the accused for an acquittal

Mens rea of the accused has much relevance in a case when the benefit under Section 84 IPC has been pleaded by an accused. So when the prosecution in this case failed to prove any motive behind the incident it would also raise a reasonable doubt of mens rea in doing the act. So as per the proposition of law laid down above, it would be a fact which creates a reasonable doubt entitling the accused to get the benefit of the exception.
Absence of proof of motive creates a doubt regarding the mens rea entitling the accused for an acquittal
In other words absence of proof of motive from the side of the prosecution creates a doubt in the mind of the court regarding the mens rea entitling the accused for an acquittal.[Para No.44]

    Though the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that medical evidence adduced from the side of the prosecution would not prove the unsoundness of mind at the time of the commission of the offence even if accepted the attending circumstances brought out during the oral evidence of the witnesses coupled with the medical evidence would create a reasonable suspicion about the soundness of the mind of the accused at the time of commission of the act. That also would enable the accused for benefit of doubt entitling for an acquittal on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution is not discharged.[Para No.45]
...............

11 November 2020

In investigation police should consider the defence put forth by the accused which if investigated fairly, may exonerate him

In Ankush Maruti Shinde The Supreme Court expressed its displeasure against the police for the manner in which it had investigated an offence in which several people were murdered and a woman raped in which, the accused persons, who were members of a nomadic tribe were falsely implicated while, the actual perpetrators of the crime who were identified by the witness's from the register at the police station, where never proceeded or investigated into. Underscoring the importance of a fair investigation, The Supreme Court held "It has to be uppermost kept in mind that impartial and truthful investigation is imperative. It is judiciously acknowledged that fair trial includes fair investigation as envisaged by Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The role of the police is to be one for protection of life, liberty and property of citizens, that investigation of offences being one of its foremost duties. That the aim of investigation is ultimately to search for truth and to bring the offender to book". In the same judgment, The Supreme Court, relying upon an earlier judgment passed in V.K. Sasikala Vs. State - (2012) 9 SCC 771, Highlighted the importance of the police in examining the documents that maybe in support of the accused and held in the following words "As observed by this Court in V.K. Sasikala v. State [V.K. Sasikala v. State, (2012) 9 SCC 771 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 1010] , though it is only such reports which support the prosecution case that are required to be forwarded to the Court under Section 173(5), in every situation where some of the seized papers and the documents do not support the prosecution case and, on the contrary, support the accused, a duty is cast on the investigating officer to evaluate the two sets of documents and materials collected and, if required, to exonerate the accused at that stage itself"[Para No.21]

    In Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat, The Supreme Court examined a case arising from a fight between two groups in which three people died. The police are alleged to have examined the case only from the standpoint of one, completely ignoring the defence of the other. Emphasising on the importance of a fair investigation, the Supreme Court held "The investigation into a criminal offence must be free from objectionable features or infirmities which may legitimately lead to a grievance on the part of the accused that investigation was unfair and carried out with an ulterior motive. It is also the duty of the investigating officer to conduct the investigation avoiding any kind of mischief and harassment to any of the accused. The investigating officer should be fair and conscious so as to rule out any possibility of fabrication of evidence and his impartial conduct must dispel any suspicion as to its genuineness. The investigating officer "is not merely to bolster up a prosecution case with such evidence as may enable the court to record a conviction but to bring out the real unvarnished truth". (Vide R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239] , Jamuna Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [(1974) 3 SCC 774 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 250 : AIR 1974 SC 1822] , SCC at p. 780, para 11 and Mahmood v. State of U.P. [(1976) 1 SCC 542 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 72 : AIR 1976 SC 69] )". Further, in the same judgement Supreme Court held "Not only fair trial but fair investigation is also part of constitutional rights guaranteed under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, investigation must be fair, transparent and judicious as it is the minimum requirement of rule of law. The investigating agency cannot be permitted to conduct an investigation in a tainted and biased manner. Where non-interference of the court would ultimately result in failure of justice, the court must interfere. In such a situation, it may be in the interest of justice that independent agency chosen by the High Court makes a fresh investigation"[Para No.22]

In investigation police should consider the defence put forth by the accused which if investigated fairly, may exonerate him
    Thus, fair investigation by the police is an imperative facet inhering in Article 21. It is not an option but a constitutional mandate on the police that when it investigates, it must be done, not from the standpoint of the prosecution alone, but also from the point of view of the accused. It has to consider the defence put forth by the accused which if investigated fairly, may exonerate him. The purpose of investigation is not to secure a conviction of the accused but to unearth the truth relating to the commission of an offence. A partisan investigation is a defective investigation which puts a question mark on the sanctity of the proceedings against the accused. If after taking the defence of the accused into consideration the police is of the view that the accused is not the person who committed the offence, in such a situation he is to be exonerated and the case against him, closed. In the present case, the investigation was initially biased and one-sided. There was even reluctance on the part of the police to accept documents from the accused. Even after the police had received the prurient photographs of the deceased, it never carried out any investigation to examine the motive of the deceased to commit suicide and whether the reason put forth by the Petitioner was plausible. The police have merely taken the material given by the Petitioner and made the same a part of the chargesheet without conducting any investigation into the defence of the Petitioner. The police have merely recorded the statement of the immediate relations of the deceased and filed the chargesheet against the Petitioner. No investigation was conducted to a certain the veracity of the allegations against the Petitioner.[Para No.23]

07 November 2020

Order of process issue u/s.204 of Cr.P.C.; passed summarily and without discussing facts, evidence, law and exact overt act, is not proper legal judicial order

As held by the Courts as above, the passing of order of summoning any person as accused is a very important matter, which initiates criminal proceeding against him. Such orders cannot be passed summarily or without applying judicial mind.[Para No.13]

    In light of this legal position I have gone through the impugned order. A perusal of this order indicates that neither any discussion of evidence was made by learned Magistrate, nor was it considered as to which accused had allegedly committed what overt act. The five accused persons of complaint were summoned for offences mentioned in it. Impugned order clearly lacks the reflection of application of judicial discretion or mind.
Order of process issue u/s.204 of Cr.P.C.; passed summarily and without discussing facts, evidence, law and exact overt act, is not proper legal judicial order
Nothing is there which may show that learned Magistrate, before passing of the order under challenge had considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence or the law. Therefore it appears that, in fact, no judicial mind was applied before the passing of impugned order of summoning. Such order cannot be accepted as a proper legal judicial order passed after following due procedure of law.
Therefore it is liable to be quashed.[Para No.14]

03 November 2020

At the time of taking cognizance on chargesheet, Magistrate is not supposed to act as a Post Office

At the time of consideration of charge Magistrate can take into consideration certain facts and documents pointed out and/or submitted by or on behalf of accused 


Filing of Civil Suit for redressal of damages does not bar a person from initiating a criminal case involving ingredients of criminal offence entitling plaintiff/complainant to initiate criminal case against the offender


    It is settled that at the time of taking cognizance of offence, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to find out as to whether trial is clearly going to culminate into conviction of accused or not, but the Magistrate has only to see whether there is prima-facie evidence on record so as to construe that there is possibility of commission of offence by the accused and even if there is evidence raising suspicion of commission of offence by accused the cognizance can be taken by the Magistrate and thereafter the accused has a right to put his version before the Court on the basis of evidence on record at the time of framing of Charge.[Para No.15]

    Parameters to be taken into consideration by the Court at the time of framing of charge are altogether different than that to be taken into consideration at the time of taking cognizance. At the time of taking of cognizance, Magistrate has to look into that material only which is placed before him by the Prosecution/Investigating Agency, but at the time of consideration of charge Magistrate can take into consideration certain facts and documents pointed out and/or submitted by or on behalf of accused and thereafter he can take a decision as to whether there is sufficient material for framing of charge or not. Recently this Court in case Siemens Enterprise Communications Pvt.. Ltd. now known as Progility Technologies Pvt. Ltd. vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, reported in 2019 (3) Shim. LC 1691, on the basis of ratio of law propounded by the Apex Court in its various pronouncements, has reiterated the power of the Magistrate as well as parameters to be taken into consideration at the time of framing of charge. It is also settled that at the time of undertaking such exercise at the time of framing of charge the Magistrate is not supposed to conduct a mini trial at the stage of framing of charge and not to appreciate evidence as warranted at the stage of conclusion of trial, but he has power to evaluate material and the documents on record alongwith material being referred by the accused if the said parameter confirms to the parameters laid down by the Apex Court reiterated in Siemens' case supra. Whereas at the stage of taking cognizance, as already stated supra, on consideration of material placed before Magistrate by prosecution/investigating agency, even if there is evidence raising suspicion of commission of offence by accused the cognizance can be taken.[Para No.16]

    No doubt, the evidence or material placed before the Magistrate, at the time of taking cognizance, is not to be evaluated on merit, but definitely it is duty of the Court to see as to whether some evidence is available on record or not.
At the time of taking cognizance on chargesheet, Magistrate is not supposed to act as a Post Office
In case, there is no evidence on record to indicate commission of alleged offence(s), the Magistrate is not supposed to act as a Post Office, but is expected to apply his judicial mind according to facts and circumstances of the case for accepting or rejecting the challan/report filed before him under Section 173 Cr.P.C.[Para No.17]

01 November 2020

Wife can proceed simultaneously under both the provisions of Sec.125 of CrPC and Sec.12 of The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act

As far as other contention raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the orders/judgment passed by learned Courts below is not sustainable in view of the fact that the petitioner was also receiving Rs.3,500/­ per month under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code Cr.P.C., is concerned,
Wife can proceed simultaneously under both the provisions of Sec.125 of CrPC and Sec.12 of The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act
the said plea of learned Counsel for the petitioner is also liable to be rejected. The provisions of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are distinct and different. Law does not prohibits the wife to proceed under both of the said statutory provisions simultaneously or Otherwise.[Para No.11]

27 October 2020

Bail can not be denied to chargesheeted accused on the ground of abscondence of other accused

It is pertinent to note that the other ground raised by the prosecution is that the co­accused, who is relative of the present applicant, is absconding and, therefore, present petitioner may not be enlarged on bail.
Bail can not be denied to chargesheeted accused on the ground of abscondence of other accused
Now, it is well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that even for securing presence or for getting whereabouts of the co­accused, no police custody remand could be granted. The same principle will apply in the case where bail is sought by the accused and the charge sheet is already filed against him/her. If there is laxity or inability of the prosecution to arrest the co­accused, on that ground the other accused against whom investigation is over and charge sheet is filed cannot be denied the right of getting bail in a given case.[Para No.7]

26 October 2020

Mere existence of motive to commit an offence by itself cannot give rise to an inference of guilt nor can it form the basis for conviction

Needless to say motive is that which impels a person to do a particular act. There can be no action without a motive. Motive may create a very strong suspicion but it cannot take the place of proof. Mere possibility of existence of motive cannot make the accused guilty, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab. Where the prosecution case depends on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes significance and goes a long way to prove the case of the prosecution as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shivaji vs. State[Para No.36]

Mere existence of motive to commit an offence by itself cannot give rise to an inference of guilt nor can it form the basis for conviction
   Mere existence of motive by itself is not an incriminating circumstance and it cannot give rise to an inference of guilt nor can it form the basis for conviction. Motive for the crime, even if adequate, cannot by itself sustain a criminal charge. In the case in hand, we have discussed elaborately how the prosecution is found wanting in establishing the "last seen" theory. Therefore, practically, there is no evidence to establish any of the circumstances, which in such type of cases, need to be established by the prosecution and even if we assume for the sake of argument that the accused was harboring a motive to commit the murder of the deceased, that in itself, for want of other positive evidence, will not sail the prosecution through.[Para No.37]

22 October 2020

There is no limitation of period for invoking High Court's inherent powers u/s.482 Cr.P.C.

If evidence is relevant, it is admissible irrespective of how it is obtained


The Investigating Agency has no power to appreciate the evidence



    Regarding limitation, although delay is duly explained in the petition, however, there is no applicability of Limitation Act on Section 482 Cr.P.C. being the inherent powers of this Court. The said section is starting itself with a non-obstante clause (Notwithstanding) therefore, this Court has power to exercise inherent powers where there is miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of law. Non-applicability of Limitation Act and non- providing of limitation period in Cr.P.C. with regard to Section 482 Cr.P.C., the intention of the legislature was not to restrict this Court to use these powers in appropriate cases. Thus, raising the issue of limitation period about Section 482 Cr.P.C. is itself contrary to the intention of legislature and the very section itself. In this regard, judgments relied upon by the respondent no.2 (complainant) are not applicable, as facts and circumstances of those cases are different from the case in hand.[Para No.49

There is no limitation of period for invoking High Court's inherent powers u/s.482 Cr.P.C.
    As far as the issue of source of document is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courts including the case of Pushpadevi M. Jatia vs. M.L. Wadhavan & Ors.: (1987) 3 SCC 367 relied upon by respondent no.2 (complainant) held that the source of the evidence is not material, as long as it is admissible under the law, the same may be considered. If evidence is relevant, it is admissible irrespective of how it is obtained.[Para No.50]

.......

18 October 2020

The proof of demand is an indispensable essentiality to prove the offence under The Prevention of Corruption Act

In the light of the serious discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution, the accused is entitled for benefit of doubt. The demand of bribe is not established by clinching evidence. Acceptance of bribe suffers from serious doubt. In Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam, it was held that Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof and the prosecution cannot aford to rests its case in the realm "may be" true but has to upgrade it in the domain of "may be", in order to steer clear of any possible surmise or conjuncture. Court must ensure that miscarriage of justice are avoided and if in the facts and circumstances, two views are possible then, the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. Applying the legal principle as above, the material on record, leave note manner of doubt that the prosecution in the present case, has failed to prove unequivocally the demand of illegal gratification and even its acceptance. In the case of P.Satyanarayna Murthy Vs. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. It was held that the proof of demand of illegal gratification is gravamen of offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the P.C. Act and in the absence thereof mistakenly the charge therefore, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would not be sufficient to prove home the charge under these sections of the Act.
As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder. In the case of B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh. It was held that the presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act can be drawn on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any oficial act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. In catena of decisions, the Apex Court has held that mere possession of recovery of currency note from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as Section 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the P.C. Act. It has been propounded that in absence of proof of demand of any illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand has been held to be an indispensable essentiality to prove the offence. In the present case, the demand as well as acceptance is under shadow of doubt and has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. 31 Considering the discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, I find that the evidence adduced against the accused by prosecution suffers from doubt. In the circumstances, the evidence relating to demand and acceptance cannot be believed. The accused is entitled for benefit of doubt and deserves to be acquitted.[Para No.30]

17 October 2020

Bail should be granted or refused based on the probability of attendance of the party to take his trial

By now it is well settled that gravity alone cannot be a decisive ground to deny bail, rather competing factors are required to be balanced by the court while exercising its discretion. It has been repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Sanjay Chandra versus Central Bureau of Investigation (2012)1 Supreme Court Cases 49; has been held as under:­ "The object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The Courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. Detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, "necessity" is the operative test. In India , it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the propose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson."[Para No.5]

Bail should granted or refused based on the probability of attendance of the party to take his trial

    Needless to say object of the bail is to secure the attendance of the accused in the trial and the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial. Otherwise also, normal rule is of bail and not jail. Apart from above, Court has to keep in mind nature of accusations, nature of evidence in support thereof, severity of the punishment, which conviction will entail, character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused involved in that crime.[Para No.6]

16 October 2020

While releasing accused on default bail u/s.167(2) of Cr.P.C. the court can not impose any condition of depositing cash amount or to report before police station daily

Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and considering the scheme and the object and purpose of default bail/statutory bail, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in imposing condition that the appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs.8,00,000/­ while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail. It appears that the High Court has imposed such a condition taking into consideration the fact that earlier at the time of hearing of the regular bail application, before the learned Magistrate, the wife of the appellant filed an affidavit agreeing to deposit Rs.7,00,000/­. However, as observed by this Court in catena of decisions and more particularly in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra), where the investigation is not completed within 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, and no chargesheet is filed by 60 th or 90th day, accused gets an “indefeasible right” to default bail, and the accused becomes entitled to default bail once the accused applies for default bail and furnish bail. Therefore, the only requirement for getting the default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. is that the accused is in jail for more than 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, and within 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, the investigation is not completed and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail. No other condition of deposit of the alleged amount involved can be imposed. Imposing such condition while releasing the accused on default bail/statutory bail would frustrate the very object and purpose of default bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. As observed by this Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) and in other decisions, the accused is entitled to default bail/statutory bail, subject to the eventuality occurring in Section 167, Cr.P.C., namely, investigation is not completed within 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, and no chargesheet is filed by 60 th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail.[Para No.9]

    As observed hereinabove and even from the impugned orders passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail has imposed the condition to deposit Rs.8,00,000/­ taking into consideration that earlier before the learned Magistrate and while considering the regular bail application under Section 437 Cr.P.C., the wife of the accused filed an affidavit to deposit Rs.7,00,000/­. That cannot be a ground to impose the condition to deposit the amount involved, while granting default bail/statutory bail.[Para No.9.1]

While releasing accused on default bail u/s.167(2) of Cr.P.C. the court can not impose any condition of depositing cash amount or to report before police station daily
    The circumstances while considering the regular bail application under Section 437 Cr.P.C. are different, while considering the application for default bail/statutory bail. Under the circumstances, the condition imposed by the High Court to deposit Rs.8,00,000/­, while releasing the appellant on default bail/ statutory bail is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside.[Para No.9.2]

15 October 2020

Residence Order passed under The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act does not impose any embargo for filing or continuing civil suit seeking permanent injuction against daughter-in-law

From the above discussions, we arrive at following conclusions:-

(i) The pendency of proceedings under Act, 2005 or any order interim or final passed under D.V. Act under Section 19 regarding right of residence is not an embargo for initiating or continuing any civil proceedings, which relate to the subject matter of order interim or final passed in proceedings under D.V. Act, 2005.
Residence Order passed under The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act does not impose any embargo for filing or continuing civil suit seeking permanent injuction against daughter-in-law

(ii) The judgment or order of criminal court granting an interim or final relief under Section 19 of D.V. Act, 2005 are relevant within the meaning of Section 43 of the Evidence Act and can be referred to and looked into by the civil court.

(iii) A civil court is to determine the issues in civil proceedings on the basis of evidence, which has been led by the parties before the civil court.

(iv) In the facts of the present case, suit filed in civil court for mandatory and permanent injunction was fully maintainable and the issues raised by the appellant as well as by the defendant claiming a right under Section 19 were to be addressed and decided on the basis of evidence, which is led by the parties in the suit.[Para No.157]

14 October 2020

Mere recovery of blood stained weapon cannot be construed as proof for the murder

For proving the contents of memorandum prepared u/s.27 of Evidence Act, the Investigating Officer must state the exact narration of facts in such document in his own words while deposing before the Court


    The direct implication of these two mandatory provisions is that a witness who steps into the witness box for proving a fact which he has seen or observed must give oral evidence to prove such fact. Manifestly, a memorandum prepared by the Investigating Officer under Section 27 of the Evidence Act refers to a fact which the Investigating Officer has seen and heard while interrogating the accused. Thus, for proving the contents of memorandum, the Investigating Officer must state the exact narration of facts in such document in his own words while deposing before the Court.

    This Court in the case of Dharma Vs. The State reported in AIR 1966 Raj 74 observed in paras 17 to 21 as under:
17. Now as regards the proving of such information, the matter seems to us to be governed by Sections 60, 159 and 160 of the Evidence Act. It is correct that statements and reports prepared outside the court cannot by themselves be accepted as primary or substantive evidence of the facts stated therein. Section 60 of the Evidence Act lays down that oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct, that is to say, if it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it, and if it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it and so on. Section 159 then permits a witness while under examination to refresh his memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or so soon afterwards that the court considers it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in the memory. Again, with the permission of the court, the witness may refresh, his memory by referring to a copy of such document. And the witness may even refer to any such writing made by any other person but which was read by him at the time the transaction was fresh in his memory and when he read it, he knew it to be correct. Section 160 then provides for cases where the witness has no independent recollection say, from lapse of memory, of the transaction to which he wants to testify by looking at the document and states that although he has no such recollection he is sure that the contents of the document were correctly recorded at the time they were. It seems to us that where a case of this character arises and the document itself has been tendered in evidence, the document becomes primary evidence in the case. See Jagan Nath v. Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 7.

    The fundamental distinction between the two sections is that while under Section 159 it is the witness's memory or recollection which is evidence, the document itself not having been tendered in evidence; under Section 160, it is the document which is evidence of the facts contained in it. It has been further held that in order to bring a case under Section 160, though the witness should ordinarily affirm on oath that he does not recollect the facts mentioned in the document, the mere omission to say so will not make the document inadmissible provided the witness swears that he is sure that the facts are correctly recorded in the document itself. Thus in Partab Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 310 it was held that where the surrounding circumstances intervening between the recording of a statement and the trial would as a matter of normal human experience render it impossible for a police officer to recollect and reproduce the words used, his statement should be treated as if he had prefaced it by stating categorically that he could not remember what the deceased in that case had said to him. Putting the whole thing in somewhat different language, what was held was that Section 160 of the Act applies equally when the witness states in so many words that he has no independent recollection of the precise words used, or when it should stand established beyond doubt that that should be so as a matter of natural and necessary conclusion from the surrounding circumstances.
    18. Again, in Krishnama v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Mad 430 a Sub-Assistant Surgeon recorded the statement made by the deceased just before his death, which took place in April, 1930, and the former was called upon to give evidence some time in July, 1930. In the Sessions Court he just put in the recorded statement of the deceased which was admitted in evidence. On appeal it was objected that such statement was wrongly admitted inasmuch as the witness did not use it to refresh his memory nor did he attempt from recollection to reproduce the words used by the accused. It was held that he could not have been expected to reproduce the words of the deceased, and therefore, he was entitled to put in the document as a correct record of what the deponent had said at the time on the theory that the statement should be treated as if the witness had prefaced it by stating categorically that he could not remember what the deceased had said.
   19. Again in Public Prosecutor v. Venkatarama Naidu, AIR 1943 Mad 542, the question arose how the notes of a speech taken by a police officer be admitted in evidence. It was held that it was not necessary that the officer should be made to testify orally after referring to those notes. The police officer should describe his attendance, the making of the relevant speech and give a description of its nature so as to identify his presence there and his attention to what was going on, and that after that it was quite enough it he said "I wrote down that speech and this is what I took down," and if the prosecution had done that, they would be considered to have proved the words. This case refers to a decision of the Lahore High Court in Om Prakash v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 867 wherein the contention was raised that the notes of a speech taken by a police officer were not admissible in evidence as he did not testify orally as to the speech and had not refreshed his memory under Section 159 of the Evidence Act from those notes. It was held that instead of deposing orally as to the speech made by the appellant, the police officer had put in the notes made by him, and that there would be no difference between this procedure and the police officer deposing orally after reference to those notes, and that for all practical purposes, that would be one and the same thing.
   20. The same view appears to us to have been taken in Emperor v. Balaram Das, AIR 1922 Cal 382 (2).
    21. From the discussion that we have made, we think that the correct legal position is somewhat like this. Normally, a police officer (or a Motbir) should reproduce the contents, of the statement made by the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act in Court by refreshing his memory under Section 159 of the Evidence Act from the memo earlier prepared thereof by him at the time the statement had been made to him or in his presence and which was recorded at the same time or soon after the making of it and that would be a perfectly unexceptionable way of proving such a statement. We do not think in this connection, however, that it would be correct to say that he can refer to the memo under Section 159 of the Evidence Act only if he establishes a case of lack of recollection and not otherwise. We further think that where the police officer swears that he does not remember the exact words used by the accused from lapse of time or a like cause or even where he does not positively say so but it is reasonably established from the surrounding circumstances (chief of which would be the intervening time between the making of the statement and the recording of the witness's deposition at the trial) that it could hardly be expected in the natural course of human conduct that he could or would have a precise or dependable recollection of the same, then under Section 160 of the Evidence Act, it would be open to the witness to rely on the document itself and swear that the contents thereof are correct where he is sure that they are so and such a case would naturally arise where he happens to have recorded the statement himself or where it has been recorded by some one else but in his own presence, and in such a case the document itself would be acceptable substantive evidence of the facts contained therein. With respect, we should further make it clear that in so far as Chhangani, J.'s holds to the contrary, we are unable to accept it as laying down the correct law. We hold accordingly."

Rejection of a bail application by Sessions Court does not operate as a bar for the High Court in entertaining a similar application under Section 439 Cr. P. C.

In the instant case, learned Principal Sessions Judge, Samba, has rejected the bail petition of both the petitioners. The question that arises for consideration is whether or not successive bail applications will lie before this Court. The law on this issue is very clear that if an earlier application was rejected by an inferior court, the superior court can always entertain the successive bail application. In this behalf, it will be profitable to quote the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case titled Gurcharan Singh & Ors vs State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1978 SC 179:

"It is significant to note that under Section 397, Cr.P.C of the new Code while the High Court and the Sessions Judge have the concurrent powers of revision, it is expressly provided under sub-section (3) of that section that when an application under that section has been made by any person to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. This is the position explicitly made clear under the new Code with regard to revision when the authorities have concurrent powers. Similar was the position under Section 435(4), Cr.P.C of the old Code with regard to concurrent revision powers of the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate. Although, under Section 435(1) Cr.P.C of the old Code the High Court, a Sessions Judge or a District Magistrate had concurrent powers of revision, the High Court's jurisdiction in revision was left untouched. There is no provision in the new Code excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with an application under Section 439(2), Cr.P.C to cancel bail after the Sessions Judge had been moved and an order had been passed by him granting bail. The High Court has undoubtedly jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 439(2), Cr.P.C for cancellation of bail notwithstanding that the Sessions Judge had earlier admitted the appellants to bail. There is, therefore, no force in the submission of Mr Mukherjee to the contrary."[Para No.5]


    Relying upon the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, the High Court of Bombay in the case titled Devi Das Raghu Nath Naik v. State, (Crimes Volume 3 1987 363), has observed as under:
Rejection of a bail application by Sessions Court does not operate as a bar for the High Court in entertaining a similar application under Section 439 Cr. P.

"The above view of the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court appears to me to be correct. In fact, it is now well-settled that there is no bar whatsoever for a party to approach either the High Court or the Sessions Court with an application for an ordinary bail made under Section 439 Cr.P.C. The power given by Section 439 to the High Court or to the Sessions Court is an independent power and thus, when the High Court acts in the exercise of such power it does not exercise any revisional jurisdiction, but its original special jurisdiction to grant bail. This being so, it becomes obvious that although under section 439 Cr.P.C. concurrent jurisdiction is given to the High Court and Sessions Court, the fact, that the Sessions Court has refused a bail under Section 439 does not operate as a bar for the High Court entertaining a similar application under Section 439 on the same facts and for the same offence. However, if the choice was made by the party to move first the High Court and the High Court has dismissed the application, then the decorum and the hierarchy of the Courts require that if the Sessions Court is moved with a similar application on the same fact, the said application be dismissed. This can be inferred also from the decision of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh's case (above)."[Para No.6]

10 October 2020

Mere registration of FIR regarding ragging of a student is not the ground for suspending the accused-student from educational institute

Before suspending accused-student, the educational institute must get satisfied itself about the truth of allegations of ragging


    Another issue raised is about the Order of Suspension passed against the Appellants. The facts on record indicate that the report of the Anti-Ragging Committee and the Order of Suspension were issued on the same date i.e. on 27.05.2019. The submission of Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Advocate, that the Order of Suspension was not based on the report of the Anti-Ragging Committee merits acceptance because of following features viz. (a) the outward number for the Order of Suspension is NDN/172 while that of the report of Anti-Ragging Committee is NDN/183, which means the Order of Suspension was issued earlier to the report of the Anti-Ragging Committee; (b) both the communications are under the signature of the Dean of the College and the Hospital and yet, the Order of Suspension does not make any reference to the report of the Anti-Ragging Committee; (c) the Order of Suspension is based purely on the registration of FIR registered against the Appellants which is why “taking cognizance of this” the Order of Suspension was passed; and (d) when a request for revocation of suspension was made, it was rejected on 25.10.2019 because of order Criminal Appeal Nos. 660-662 of 2020 (@ SLP (Crl.)Nos. 3083-3085 of 2020) Ankita Kailash Khandelwal & Ors. vs State of Maharashtra & Ors. dated 09.08.2019 of the High court and not because of the report of the Anti-Ragging Committee.[Para No.25]

    The relevant provisions of 1999 Act show that if any student is found guilty of ragging or abetment of ragging, he can, on conviction be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years and by virtue of Section 5, any student convicted of such offence shall be dismissed from the educational institution and cannot be admitted in any other educational institution for a period of five years. We are not concerned with any eventuality arising or occurring by virtue of Sections 4 and 5 of 1999 Act.

    To take appropriate action under Section 6(1) of 1999 Act, the concerned head of the educational institution must prima facie be satisfied that the allegations against the student have been found to be true, whereafter, an order of suspension can be passed.

Mere registration of FIR regarding ragging of a student is not the ground for suspending the accused-student from educational institute
  As stated hereinabove, the Order of Suspension does not even record any such finding or prima facie view. As a matter of fact, the Order of Suspension was not passed by virtue of power entrusted under Section 6(1) of 1999 Act but was based on the grounds that the Appellants were creating hurdles in the enquiry by the police and that there was an FIR against them. We, thus, conclude that the Order of Suspension is not referable to Section 6(1) of 1999 Act.

    Apart from Section 6(1) as aforesaid, no other statutory provision has been referred to or relied upon.[para No.26]

09 October 2020

Court of Sessions can permit u/s. 301, 24(8) of CrPC to the advocate of victim to make oral argument too apart from submission of the written argument

Advocate is treated to be officer of the court and supposed to assist the court in arriving the truth, so, right to address the court to an Advocate cannot be curtailed while representing his client


    In proviso added to Section 24(8) Cr.P.C., the word used are "assist the prosecution" and not to assist the public Prosecutor as mentioned in Section 301 Cr.P.C. There is difference in the scheme of two sections. From perusal of Sub-section 2 of section 301 Cr.P.C., made it clear that if in any case private person instruct a pleader to prosecute any person in any court even though the Public Prosecutor in charge of case shall conduct the prosecution and the pleader instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor. Up to this stage no permission of court is needed for appointment of pleader by a private person. The permission is only required to the pleader if he want to file written argument in the case. However after insertion of proviso to Section 24(8) Cr.P.C., the court can permits a victims advocate to assist the prosecution. The status and position of Advocate engaged by the victim would be changed because in that situation the court at the very inception may permit the Advocate of the choice of the victim to participate in the proceeding and to assist the prosecution and not to the public prosecutor. Prosecution include investigation, enquiry, trial and appeal within the meaning of Section 24 Cr.P.C. Section 301 Cr.P.C., deals with only inquiry, trial or appeal. Inquiry has been defined in Section 2(g) Cr.P.C., means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court. As such inquiry is different from investigation as defined in section 2(h) Cr.P.C.[Para No.39]

    Neither word prosecution nor trial has been defined in the Cr.P.C. Trial has been defined by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav [(1996) 4 SCC 127]. It means an act of proving or judicial examination or determination of the issues including its own jurisdiction or authority in accordance with law or adjudging guilt or innocence of the accused including all steps necessary thereto. Meaning of trial changes in view of specific provision of the code. The expression trial used in Section 306 Cr.P.C., includes both an inquiry as well as trial as held by the Apex Court in A. Devendran v. State of Tamilnadu (1997) 11 SCC 720.[Para No.40]

    The prosecution has not been defined specifically in the light of proviso to Section 24(8) Cr.P.C. The meaning of word prosecution as defined in Webster Dictionary, 3rd Edition is as follow;
"the carrying out of a plan, project, or course of action to or toward a specific end."[Para No.41]
..........

Court of Sessions can permit u/s. 301, 24(8) of CrPC to the advocate of victim to make oral argument too apart from submission of the written argument
    The whole scheme if taken into consideration for prosecution and trial of an accused the dominant role is played by the public prosecutor but by insertion of proviso to Section 24(8) Cr.P.C., the Court is now authorised to permit the victim to engage a lawyer of his choice to assist the prosecution. The prosecution of an offender is virtually carried out in the court of law constituted under some statute presided over by a judge and not by any party to the proceedings. The public prosecutors, the advocate of the accused or special counsel appointed by the aggrieved person or the Advocate engaged by a victim, all are officers of the court. They all assist the court to arrive at truth during prosecution of an accused. Therefore in section 24 or in section 301 phrase with the permission of court is used. So, once the permission is accorded to the Advocate of the victim to assist the prosecution his assistance could not be restricted to the terminology of Section 301, i.e., only to assist the prosecutor. The court in view of the same can permit to advance the oral argument too to the Advocate engaged by the victim apart from submission of the written argument. The importance of oral argument cannot be out weight by saying that right to written argument has been given in Section 301 Cr.P.C.[Para No.43]
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