Showing posts with label sec.167(2) of CrPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sec.167(2) of CrPC. Show all posts

16 October 2020

While releasing accused on default bail u/s.167(2) of Cr.P.C. the court can not impose any condition of depositing cash amount or to report before police station daily

Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and considering the scheme and the object and purpose of default bail/statutory bail, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in imposing condition that the appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs.8,00,000/­ while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail. It appears that the High Court has imposed such a condition taking into consideration the fact that earlier at the time of hearing of the regular bail application, before the learned Magistrate, the wife of the appellant filed an affidavit agreeing to deposit Rs.7,00,000/­. However, as observed by this Court in catena of decisions and more particularly in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra), where the investigation is not completed within 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, and no chargesheet is filed by 60 th or 90th day, accused gets an “indefeasible right” to default bail, and the accused becomes entitled to default bail once the accused applies for default bail and furnish bail. Therefore, the only requirement for getting the default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. is that the accused is in jail for more than 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, and within 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, the investigation is not completed and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail. No other condition of deposit of the alleged amount involved can be imposed. Imposing such condition while releasing the accused on default bail/statutory bail would frustrate the very object and purpose of default bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. As observed by this Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) and in other decisions, the accused is entitled to default bail/statutory bail, subject to the eventuality occurring in Section 167, Cr.P.C., namely, investigation is not completed within 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, and no chargesheet is filed by 60 th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail.[Para No.9]

    As observed hereinabove and even from the impugned orders passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail has imposed the condition to deposit Rs.8,00,000/­ taking into consideration that earlier before the learned Magistrate and while considering the regular bail application under Section 437 Cr.P.C., the wife of the accused filed an affidavit to deposit Rs.7,00,000/­. That cannot be a ground to impose the condition to deposit the amount involved, while granting default bail/statutory bail.[Para No.9.1]

While releasing accused on default bail u/s.167(2) of Cr.P.C. the court can not impose any condition of depositing cash amount or to report before police station daily
    The circumstances while considering the regular bail application under Section 437 Cr.P.C. are different, while considering the application for default bail/statutory bail. Under the circumstances, the condition imposed by the High Court to deposit Rs.8,00,000/­, while releasing the appellant on default bail/ statutory bail is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside.[Para No.9.2]

16 September 2020

Oral prayer of default bail u/s.167(2) can be allowed in hearing of Regular Bail Application u/s.439 of Cr.P.C. if chargesheet is not filed within prescribed period

In the present case, it was also argued by learned counsel for the State that the petitioner did not apply for ‘default bail’ on or after 4th January, 2017 till 24th January, 2017 on which date his indefeasible right got extinguished on the filing of the charge sheet. Strictly speaking this is correct since the petitioner applied for regular bail on 11th January, 2017 in the Gauhati High Court – he made no specific application for grant of ‘default bail’. However, the application for regular bail filed by the accused on 11th January, 2017 did advert to the statutory period for filing a charge sheet having expired and that perhaps no charge sheet had in fact being filed. In any event, this issue was argued by learned counsel for the petitioner in the High Court and it was considered but not accepted by the High Court. The High Court did not reject the submission on the ground of maintainability but on merits. Therefore it is not as if the petitioner did not make any application for default bail – such an application was definitely made (if not in writing) then at least orally before the High Court. In our opinion, in matters of personal liberty, we cannot and should not be too technical and must lean in favour of personal liberty. Consequently, whether the accused makes a written application for ‘default bail’ or an oral application for ‘default bail’ is of no consequence. The concerned court must deal with such an application by considering the statutory requirements namely, whether the statutory period for filing a charge sheet or challan has expired, whether the charge sheet or challan has been filed and whether the accused is prepared to and does furnish bail.[Para No.40]

Oral prayer of default bail u/s.167(2) can be allowed in hearing of Regular Bail Application u/s.439 of Cr.P.C. if chargesheet is not filed within prescribed period
    We take this view keeping in mind that in matters of personal liberty and Article 21 of the Constitution, it is not always advisable to be formalistic or technical. The history of the personal liberty jurisprudence of this Court and other constitutional courts includes petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and for other writs being entertained even on the basis of a letter addressed to the Chief Justice or the Court.[Para No.41]

    Strong words indeed. That being so we are of the clear opinion that adapting this principle, it would equally be the duty and responsibility of a court on coming to know that the accused person before it is entitled to ‘default bail’, to at least apprise him or her of the indefeasible right. A contrary view would diminish the respect for personal liberty, on which so much emphasis has been laid by this Court as is evidenced by the decisions mentioned above, and also adverted to in Nirala Yadav.[Para No.44]

    On 11th January, 2017 when the High Court dismissed the application for bail filed by the petitioner, he had an indefeasible right to the grant of ‘default bail’ since the statutory period of 60 days for filing a charge sheet had expired, no charge sheet or challan had been filed against him (it was filed only on 24 th January, 2017) and the petitioner had orally applied for ‘default bail’. Under these circumstances, the only course open to the High Court on 11 th January, 2017 was to enquire from the petitioner whether he was prepared to furnish bail and if so then to grant him ‘default bail’ on reasonable conditions. Unfortunately, this was completely overlooked by the High Court.[Para No.45]

21 August 2020

In computing period of 60/90 days for default bail u/s.167(2) of CrPC, first day of remand is to be included

The applicability of the aforesaid principle and also of the provision contained in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act would be of some semblance/relevance, where the law/statute prescribes a limitation and in terms of Section 9, if in any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897 it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘from’ and ‘for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word ‘to’. The principle would be attracted when a period is delimited by a Statute or Rule, which has both a beginning and an end; the word ‘from’ indicate the beginning and then the opening day is to be excluded and then the last day is included by use of words ‘to’. The requisite form for applicability of Section 9 is prescribed for a period ‘from’ and ‘to’, i.e. when the period is marked by terminus quo and terminus ad quem.

    If this principle is the underlining principle for applicability of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, perusal of Section 167 (2) would reveal that there is no starting point or an end point. In the scheme of the Code, as has been elaborated above, the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 167 runs in continuation of sub-section (2). Production of the accused before the Magistrate is a sequel of his arrest by the police in exercise of their power and the mandate of the police, and at the same time, a right of the accused to be produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours. The day on which the accused is brought on remand before the Magistrate, sub-section (2) of Section 167 empowers the Magistrate to authorize the detention with the police either by continuing it or remanding him to Magisterial custody. There cannot be a pause/break between the two processes. There is no de-limitation conceptualized in Section 167 nor can it be befitted into a period of limitation ‘from’ and ‘to’ as there is no limitation for completion of investigation and filing of the charge-sheet. The production before the Magistrate is a process in continuation of his arrest by the police and the Magistrate will authorize his detention for not more than 15 days in the whole but if he is satisfied that sufficient ground exist, he may authorise his detention beyond 15 days otherwise than in custody of police. There is no starting point or end point for the authorities to complete their action but if the investigation is not completed and charge-sheet not filed within 60 days or 90 days, a right accrues to the accused to be released on bail.

In computing period of 60/90 days for default bail u/s167(2) of CrPC, first day of remand is to be included

    The anterior period of custody with the police prior to the remand is no detention pursuant to an authorization issued from the Magistrate. The period of detention by the Magistrate runs only from the date of order of first remand. Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C pertain to the power of the Magistrate to remand an accused and there is no reason why the first day has to be excluded. The sub-section finds place in a provision which prescribe the procedure when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours and distinct contingencies are carved out in sub-section (2); the first being the Magistrate authorizing the detention of the accused for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole, secondly, when the Magistrate do not consider further detention necessary and thirdly, the Magistrate authorise the detention beyond period of 15 days if adequate grounds exists for doing so. However, there is no time stipulated as to extension of custody beyond period of 15 days with a maximum limit on the same. The accused can be in magisterial custody for unlimited point of time if he is not admitted to bail. In order to avoid the long incarceration of an accused for the mere reason that the investigation is being carried out in a leisurely manner, prompted the legislature to confer a right on the accused to be released on bail if he is prepared to do so and the investigation can still continue. This is the precise reason why the General clauses Act cannot be made applicable to sub-section (2) of Section 167 and the submission of Mr.Singh to the effect that the first day of remand will have to be excluded, would result into a break in the continuity of the custody of the accused which begin on his arrest and which could have continued till conclusion of investigation but for insertion of proviso to subsection (2) of Section 167.

09 July 2020

Bail application u/s.167(2) of CrPC must be dispose of forthwith

Now, the law in relation to the right of an accused to bail in the event charge-sheet is not filed within the stipulated time-frame under section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is well settled. In Achpal alias Ramswaroop & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan : (2019) 14 SCC 599, the Supreme Court has reiterated the following position of law:

"11. The law on the point as to the rights of an accused who is in custody pending investigation and where the investigation is not completed within the period prescribed under Section 167(2) of the Code, is crystallised in the judgment of this Court in Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra. This case took into account the decision of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, Sanjay Dutt (2) v. State and Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat. Pattanaik, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for the majority recorded conclusions in para 13 of his judgment. For the present purposes, we may extract Conclusions 3 and 4 as under: (Uday Mohanlal Acharya case, SCC p. 473, para 13) "13. ... 3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate.
Bail application u/s.167(2) of CrPC must be dispose of forthwith
4.  When an application for bail is filed by an accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have been accrued in his favour on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the specified period, the Magistrate/court must dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days, as specified and no charge-sheet has been filed by the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate/court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate of an accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated."

03 July 2020

Accused is not entitled for default bail u/s.167(2) of Cr.P.C. if chargesheet has already been filed before his surrender in the court

Offence u/s. 420, 406, 409, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of IPC and 7 & 13(1) A of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Chargesheet against one accused filed on 23.01.2019 - applicant-accused shown as absconded - on 23.11.2019 applicant-accused surrendered before the court - application for default bail u/s.167(2) of Cr.P.C. filed om 24.02.2020

Held: It is not essential for a person to be arrested before chargesheet can be presented against him. The only requirement for applicability of the proviso to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is that investigation should be pending against the petitioner-accused and no investigation can be said to be pending if chargesheet is filed before his arrest or surrender before the court.


   A perusal of the challan presented on 23.01.2019, a copy whereof is annexed as Annexure P-2, shows that list of the case property had been filed therewith along with a list of witnesses. Thereafter, the facts of the case have been narrated. The last few lines are reproduced:-
"The warrants have been got issued from the Learned Illaqa Magistrate against Sandeep Kumar son of Jagdish Chander r/o Panj Ke Utar Police Station Guruharsahai, Rishu Matneja w/o Sandeep Kumar r/o Panj Ke Utar Police Station Guruharsahai, Jaswinder Pal Singh son of Gurmeet Singh r/o Dashmesh Nagar Jalalabad, Jasmeet Singh son of Amarjeet Singh r/o Jalalabad. Hansa Singh, Inspector Grade 2, resident of Shamshabad, District Fazilka, Harpreet Singh son of Gurmeet Singh resident of Dashmesh Nagar, Jalalabad and after arresting them supplementary challan would be presented in the court and after getting evidence of involvement of staff of Punjab National Bank, a separate supplementary challan would be submitted against them. The pending enquiry of the case after taking the record and thereafter supplementary challan shall be presented. As per the evidence, the investigation till and the evidence collected on file challan under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 406, 120-B IPC against accused Sandeep Kumar is required to be presented and the same after being prepared against Sandeep Kumar under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 406, 120-B IPC is being presented to the Court. The witnesses mentioned
in Column no.6 shall give their statements as required."[Para No.11]
Accused is not entitled for default bail u/s.167 of Cr.P.C. if chargesheet has already been filed before his surrender in the court
From the aforementioned reproduction from the challan it is evident that evidence necessary for commencement of trial against the petitioner and his co-accused has/had been collected by the investigating agency. The petitioner was kept in column No.2 only because he had not been arrested as is the practice in the State of Punjab. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not refuted the submission of the learned State counsel that such a practice exists in the State of Punjab. Warrants of arrest had been requested for and this would not have been the case if the petitioner had not been found guilty. The challan dated 24.02.2020 against the petitioner was only a formality. In Dinesh Dalmia (supra) it has been held as follows:-

13 May 2020

Denial of default bail u/s.167(2) of Cr.P.C. amounts to violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India

Does denial of default bail available u/s.167(2) of Cr.P.C. amounts violation of fundamental rights if accused?
Denial-of-default-bail-is-violation-of-fundamental-rights

Article 21 states that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. So long as the language of Section 167(2) of Cr.Pc remains as it is, I have to necessarily hold that denial of compulsive bail to the petitioner herein will definitely amount to violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.[Para No.14]

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