Showing posts with label anticipatory. Show all posts
Showing posts with label anticipatory. Show all posts

19 June 2021

Continuous and consensual sex between two adults cannot be considered as Rape

Upon considering the arguments and on perusal of the records, it goes to show that admittedly the victim and petitioner are major and they are Central Government employees. The petitioner is working as Superintendent of Central GST, West Commissionerate, Banashankari, Bangalore and the victim is working at the Office of the Central GST, East Commissionerate, Domlur, Bangalore. The introduction of the victim and the petitioner was in the year 2013 and the sexual assault started in the year 2014 at Bangalore. Thereafter till 2018 it was continued in Shivamogga and other various places. But the victim had not complained against the petitioner for having sexual abuse on her earlier. Learned counsel for the petitioner brought to the notice of this Court and relied upon the various judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Versus The State of Maharashtra and Anr. and in the case of SIDDHARAM SATLINGAPPA MHETRE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA in respect of the principles for granting Anticipatory Bail. He also submitted that wife of the petitioner lodged a complaint against the very victim on 31.01.2019 at Kodigehalli Police Station. The victim was summoned by the police and she has given statement to the police she has never stated anything about sexual harassment on her by the petitioner and she gave a reply on 01.02.2019. The petitioner has also given a complaint to the Commercial Street Police on 30.10.2020 for making false allegations on him that he has cheated an amount even though the amount was refunded.[Para No.7]

    On perusal of the records, admittedly the petitioner alleged to have been sexually assault on the victim, of course with consent as both of them are major and officers of the Central Government. Though the victim came to know about the marital status of the petitioner before 2018 itself, but no complaint has been lodged by her either for cheating or for sexual assault on her. Even in the complaint she has stated that she has filed complaint against one Anthony Raj for sexual assault on her in the working place. On enquiry also she has stated that she has not lodged any complaint against this petitioner through out 2014 to 2018. On perusal of entire records, it appears, both, the petitioner and victim had sexual affairs with consent and it cannot be considered as rape as per the decision of Section 375 of the IPC
Continuous and consensual sex between two adults cannot be considered as Rape
when both adults having continuous consensual sex which cannot be considered as Rape. This Court will not going to the other contention regarding sexual assault on the woman in work place and conducting an Departmental enquiry. The recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Journalist Varun Hiremath vs. State of Delhi, where the Supreme Court has held that if the man and woman are in room, man makes a request and woman complies and it is stated no need to say anything more and for cancellation of the bail granted to the journalist has been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.[Para No.8]

06 April 2021

It is appropriate case for grant of anticipatory bail when F.I.R. is lodged by way of counterblast to an earlier F.I.R lodged/complaint filed by the accused against the informant in near proximity of time

The following can be considered as "appropriate cases" for grant of anticipatory bail to an accused apprehending arrest, even after submission of charge-sheet against the accused by the Investigating Officer of the police/after taking cognizance of offence against accused under Section 204 Cr.P.C. by the Court :-
1) Where the charge-sheet has been submitted by the Investigating Officer/cognizance has been taken by the Court, but the merits of the F.I.R/complaint that has been lodged by the informant/complainant are such that it cannot be proved against the accused in the Court;
2) Where there exists a civil remedy and resort has been made to criminal remedy. This has been done because either the civil remedy has become barred by law of limitation or involves time-consuming procedural formalities or involves payment of heavy court fee, like in recovery suits.
    The distinction between civil wrong and criminal wrong is quite distinct and the courts should not permit a person to be harassed by surrendering and obtaining bail when no case for taking cognizance of the alleged offences has been made out against him since wrong alleged is a civil wrong only.
    When the allegations make out a civil and criminal wrong both against an accused, the remedy of anticipatory bail should be considered favourably, in case the implication in civil wrong provides for opportunity of hearing before being implicated and punished/penalized. The criminal remedy, in most of the cases, entails curtailment of right to liberty without any opportunity of hearing after lodging of complaint and F.I.R under the provisions of Cr.P.C. which is pre-independence law and disregards Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in such cases where civil and criminal remedy both were available to the informant/complainant, and he has chosen criminal remedy only, anticipatory bail should be favourably considered in such cases.
3) When the F.I.R/complaint has clearly been lodged by way of counterblast to an earlier F.I.R lodged/complaint filed by the accused against the informant/complainant in mear
It is appropriate case for grant of anticipatory bail when F.I.R. is lodged by way of counterblast to an earlier F.I.R lodged/complaint filed by the accused against the informant in near proximity of time
proximity of time. The motive of lodging the false F.I.R/complaint is apparent and from the material collected by the Investigating Officer or from the statements of witnesses in complaint case, there is no consideration of the earlier F.I.R lodged/complaint filed by the accused against the informant/complainant;
4) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R/complaint or in the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same, taken at their face value, do not make out any case against the accused or the F.I.R/complaint does not discloses the essential ingredients of the offences alleged;
5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R/complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach such conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
6) Where charge-sheet has been submitted on the basis of evidence or materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible;

31 December 2020

Relatives of the Muslim husband cannot be accused of the offence of pronouncement of triple talaq; the offence can only be committed by a Muslim man

Sec. 7(c) of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019 does not impose an absolute bar on granting regular or anticipatory bail



    Under Section 3, a pronouncement of talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife has been rendered void and illegal. Under Section 4, a Muslim husband who pronounces talaq upon his wife, as referred to in Section 3, is punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to three years. The prohibition in Sections 3 and 4 is evidently one which operates in relation to a Muslim husband alone. This is supported by the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill 2019, when it was introduced in the Parliament. The reasons for the introduction of the bill specifically stated that the bill was to give effect to the ruling of this court in Shayara Bano v. Union of India [(2017) 9 SCC 1], and to „liberate‟ Muslim women from the customary practice of talaq-e-biddat (divorce by triple talaq) by Muslim men. It is in this context that the provisions of Section 7 would have to be interpreted. Section 7 provides as follows:
“7. Offences to be cognizable, compoundable, etc: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, -
(a) an offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable, if information relating to the commission of the offence is given to an officer in charge of a police station by the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced or any person related to her by blood or marriage;
(b) an offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable, at the instance of the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced with the permission of the Magistrate, on such terms and conditions as he may determine;
(c) no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act shall be released on bail unless the Magistrate, on an application filed by the accused and after hearing the married Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced, is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for granting bail to such person."

    The provisions of Section 7(c) apply to the Muslim husband. The offence which is created by Section 3 is on the pronouncement of a talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife. Section 3 renders the pronouncement of talaq void and illegal. Section 4 makes the Act of the Muslim husband punishable with imprisonment. Thus, on a preliminary analysis,
Relatives of the Muslim husband cannot be accused of the offence of pronouncement of triple talaq the offence can only be committed by a Muslim man
it is clear that the appellant as the mother-in-law of the second respondent cannot be accused of the offence of pronouncement of triple talaq under the Act as the offence can only be committed by a Muslim man.[Para No.7]

27 December 2020

filing of a first information report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438 of Cr.P.C.

(i) Grant of an order of unconditional anticipatory bail would be “plainly contrary to the very terms of Section 438.” Even though the terms of Section 438(1) confer discretion, Section 438(2) “confers on the court the power to include such conditions in the direction as it may think fit in the light of the facts of the particular case, including the conditions mentioned in clauses (i) to (iv) of that sub-section.”

(ii) Grant of an order under Section 438(1) does not per se hamper investigation of an offence; Section 438(1)(i) and (ii) enjoin that an accused/applicant should co-operate with investigation. Sibbia (supra) also stated that courts can fashion appropriate conditions governing bail, as well. One condition can be that if the police make out a case of likely recovery of objects or discovery of facts under Section 27 (of the Evidence Act, 1872), the accused may be taken into custody. Given that there is no formal method prescribed by Section 46 of the Code if recovery is made during a statement (to the police) and pursuant to the accused volunteering the fact, it would be a case of recovery during “deemed arrest” (Para 19 of Sibbia).

(iii) The accused is not obliged to make out a special case for grant of anticipatory bail; reading an otherwise wide power would fetter the court’s discretion. Whenever an application (for relief under Section 438) is moved, discretion has to be always exercised judiciously, and with caution, having regard to the facts of every case. (Para 21, Sibbia).

(iv) While the power of granting anticipatory bail is not ordinary, at the same time, its use is not confined to exceptional cases (Para 22, Sibbia).

(v) It is not justified to require courts to only grant anticipatory bail in special cases made out by accused, since the power is extraordinary, or that several considerations – spelt out in Section 437- or other considerations, are to be kept in mind. (Para 24-25, Sibbia).

(vi) Overgenerous introduction (or reading into) of constraints on the power to grant anticipatory bail would render it Constitutionally vulnerable. Since fair procedure is part of Article 21, the court should not throw the provision (i.e. Section 438) open to challenge “by reading words in it which are not to be found therein.” (Para 26).

(vii) There is no “inexorable rule” that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the applicant is the target of mala fides. There are several relevant considerations to be factored in, by the court, while considering whether to grant or refuse anticipatory bail. Nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the accused’s presence not being secured during trial; a reasonable apprehension that the witnesses might be tampered with, and “the larger interests of the public or the state” are some of the considerations. A person seeking relief (of anticipatory bail) continues to be a man presumed to be innocent. (Para 31, Sibbia).

(viii) There can be no presumption that any class of accused- i.e. those accused of particular crimes, or those belonging to the poorer sections, are likely to abscond. (Para 32, Sibbia).

(ix) Courts should exercise their discretion while considering applications for anticipatory bail (as they do in the case of bail). It would be unwise to divest or limit their discretion by prescribing “inflexible rules of general application.”. (Para 33, Sibbia).

(x) The apprehension of an applicant, who seeks anticipatory bail (about his imminent or possible arrest) should be based on reasonable grounds, and rooted on objective facts or materials, capable of examination and evaluation, by the court, and not based on vague un-spelt apprehensions. (Para 35, Sibbia).

(xi) The grounds for seeking anticipatory bail should be examined by the High Court or Court of Session, which should not leave the question for decision by the concerned Magistrate. (Para 36, Sibbia).

filing of a first information report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438

(xii) Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent for exercising power under Section 438; it can be done on a showing of reasonable belief of imminent arrest (of the applicant). (Para 37, Sibbia).

(xiii) Anticipatory bail can be granted even after filing of an FIR- as long as the applicant is not arrested. However, after arrest, an application for anticipatory bail is not maintainable. (Para 38-39, Sibbia).

17 November 2020

Magistrate; after taking cognizance, cannot issue, at the first instance, non bailable arrest warrant against accused who has obtained anticipatory bail

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners were granted anticipatory bail by this Court in the FIR registered against them bearing No.3/2003 at Police Station Khetri, District Jhunjhunu under Section(s) 418, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 406 & 120-B IPC. The police submitted a Final Report whereafter protest petition was filed, which was dismissed.
    Against the dismissal order of the protest petition, a revision petition was filed, which was allowed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khetri and the matter was remanded back to the Court to pass a fresh order on 18.7.2018, whereafter the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance on 11.1.2019 and summoned the petitioners through arrest warrants. The said order of remand was challenged by the petitioners before the High Court and the High Court had stayed the said proceedings. Taking into consideration the order of taking cognizance, the petition was declared infructuous.[Para No.1]

    Learned Magistrate thereafter again issued arrest warrants.[Para No.2]
......

    For the aforesaid backdrop, this Court notices that it is a case where on remand from the District Judge, the Court has taken cognizance of the offences relating to allegations under Sections 418, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 406 & 120-B IPC. The High Court vide its order dated 29.4.2003 had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioners with the condition that in the event of arresting the petitioners, they shall be released on bail.
    
    Keeping in view the conditions laid down in Sushila Agarwal & Others (supra), this Court is of the firm view that
Magistrate; after taking cognizance, cannot issue, at the first instance, non bailable arrest warrants against accused who has obtained anticipatory bail
the action of the learned Magistrate from the date, it has taken cognizance and upto passing of the impugned order dated 3.9.2020 has acted in clear violation of the orders passed by the High Court after having granted anticipatory bail. There was no occasion for the learned Magistrate to have issued the arrest warrants and such course or power was not available with it in spite of having been given to it.

01 September 2020

After dismissal of petition for quashing of offence under STSC Atrocity Act, application u/s. 438 for anticipatory bail can not be considered

The appellants upon such filing of the complaint, raised an issue that the ingredients of the offences are prima facie not established and thereby initially, preferred a petition for quashing before the High Court, being Criminal Misc. Application No.6223 of 2017 and by raising multiple contentions about non-applicability of the provisions of the Act, a request was made to quash the complaint. But, after hearing both the sides at length, the said petition for quashing came to be withdrawn vide order dated 11.12.2019 and the interim order which was granted earlier on 6.3.2017 was vacated. Of-course for a period of one week, the said protection was extended.[Para No.3]

    It appears from the record that after disposal of the petition for quashing, the present appellants appeared to have rushed down for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code ('the Code' for short) before learned District and Sessions Judge, (Special Atrocity Court) at Surat, which application came up for consideration before learned 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Surat, who by order dated 24.12.2019 was pleased to dismiss the same, which has given rise to present Criminal Appeal before this court [Para No.4]

    At this stage, even if the Court may consider that after disposal of the petition for quashing, application under Section 438 of the Code can be considered, but, in view of the fact that after exhausting meritorious contentions, the petition for quashing came to be disposed of and hence very little scope is left for the Court to consider Section 438 request of the appellants, since prima facie, it cannot be said that no offence is made out and further, it is not open for the bail Court to jump to a conclusion of this elementary stage that this complaint is nothing but abuse of process of law, particularly when the quashing petition is already disposed of. Therefore, with full effect, embargo created by the Statute by way of Section 18 and 18A of the Atrocity Act, the request for anticipatory bail cannot be considered.The intention of the legislature is not to be brushed aside as has been held by the Apex Court. Large number of decisions which are pressed into service, in the considered opinion of this Court, are of no avail to the appellants, particularly when in recent pronouncement of the judgment in the case of Prathvi Raj Chauhan (supra), the Court has expressly made it clear that liberal use of power to grant pre- arrest bail would defeat the intention of the Parliament. So, the Court would not like to exercise the discretion in view of this peculiar set of circumstance and having gone through the overall material on record, the appeal is found to be merit-less since facts are altogether different.[Para No.12]

22 July 2020

Possibility of improvisation should be considered by Special Judge while deciding anticipatory bail in SC & ST Atrocity offences

When facts constituting atrocity are not mentioned in FIR but added in supplementary statement the it does not rule out possibility of improvisation.


   The important point that the learned Special Judge failed to consider is that, there is absolutely no mention in First Information Report of those facts which would attract offence under Atrocities Act. Those facts came to be mentioned in the supplementary statement. The possibility of improvisation should have been considered by the Special Judge. Definitely the ratio laid down in Prithviraj Chavan's case (Supra) is required to be considered and in the said case it has been observed thus, "10. Concerning the applicability of provisions of section 438 of Cr.P.C., it shall not apply tot he cases under Act of 1989. However, if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1989, the bar created by section 18 and 18A (I) shall not apply. We have clarified this aspect while deciding the review petitions "

Possibility of improvisation should be considered Special Judge while deciding anticipatory bail in SC & ST Atrocity offences
  Therefore, if we brush aside those allegations under the Atrocities Act, what remains is only the offences under Indian Penal Code and Information Technology Act. Those remaining allegations do not require physical custody of the appellant for the purpose of investigation. Time and again this Court is observing the approach of the Special Judges under the Atrocities Act, who are dealing with the bail applications. They are not considering the facts of the case in proper manner and only on the apparent allegations and especially without considering the ratio laid down in Prithviraj Chavan's case (Supra), just dismissing the bail applications, especially the pre-arrest bail applications holding that, there is bar under Section 18 of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atocities) Act, 1989. Time has again come to remind the Special Judges under the Atrocities Act that, they should consider the ratio laid down in Prithviraj Chavan's case (Supra) and other Judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court in proper manner while dealing with the bail applications.[Para No.9]

16 May 2020

Submission of the charge-sheet is not a lock gate to seek anticipatory bail

F.I.R. alleging non bailable offence registere - During the course of investigation notices under Section 41(A) of Cr.P.C. have been served upon the accused upon which he has given reply through Email - After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet against the accused filed in the Court - Court took cognizance and issued summons to accused.

Is application seeking anticipatory bail after filling of chargesheet tenable?

   Submission of the charge-sheet is not a lock gate for the applicant to be enlarged on anticipatory bail.

18 April 2020

Bail applications has to be decided expeditiously

Bail-applications-to-be- decided-expeditiouslyThe application for bail or anticipatory bail is a matter of moment for the accused and protracted hearing thereof may also cause prejudice to the investigation and affect the prosecution interests which cannot be comprehended in this order. Such application needs to be dealt with expeditiously and finally, one way or the other and cannot brook delay.

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