Judicial discretion cannot be so liberally exercised as to condone the delay where no cause is made out or the cause ascribed is unworthy of acceptance

The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one

    A profitable reference in this context can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and others, 2010(8) Supreme Court Cases 685, wherein after adverting to a number of precedents, including the judgment in the case of Perumon Bhagwathy Devaswom (supra), the Supreme Court cautioned against construing the provisions of the Order XXII of the Code and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in such a manner as to render them redundant and inoperative.[Para No.17]

    The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 32 to 35 and 38 are instructive. They read asunder:

“32. It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly.

    Furthermore, it is also a well settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to the provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. Once the legislature has enacted the provisions of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of such an application, all these provisions have to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law.

34. Liberal construction of the expression ‘sufficient cause' is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the Court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the Court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect “sufficient cause” as understood in law. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition 1997).

35. The expression “sufficient cause” implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word “sufficient” means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated.

36…………………………………………………………….

37…………………………………………………………….

38. Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this,the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The 

statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi-benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay in the filing of such applications.”[Para No.18]

No contract employee has any vested right to continue or to have his or her contract renewed

From the aforesaid observations which have been made by the Apex Court on the status of honorary employment in the service, it appears to this Court that it is not open for the petitioner to claim any relief, as tried to be sought in the present proceedings. Since throughout has accepted the status as honorary Medical Officer purely on contractual basis with open eyes and continued to discharge without any demur and throughout even during the extended period of his contract, the basic terms and conditions have remained unchanged. That being the position, it appears to this Court that hardly any case is made out by the petitioner to call for any interference to grant any relief as prayed for.[Para No.14]

    Additionally, it is a settled position of law that the contractual employment has no any vested right to continue

nor normally it is open for the Court to give any mandate to an employer to continue the contract or to change the status of the contractual employment in any manner. Once the same having been accepted by consent of both the sides without any demur and as such, the relevant observations contained in the following decisions of the Apex Court with regard to the status of even contractual employment, the Court would like to incorporate hereunder some of the relevant observations mentioned in the following decisions:

(1) In the case of Yogesh Mahajan Vs. Professor R.C. Deka, Director, All India Institute of Medical Sciences, reported in (2018) 3 SCC 218, Hon'ble the Apex Court has observed in para 6,7 and 8 as under:

6. It is settled law that no contract employee has a right to have his or her contract renewed from time to time. That being so, we are in agreement with the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court that the petitioner was unable to show any statutory or other right to have his contract extended beyond 30th June, 2010. At best, the petitioner could claim that the concerned authorities should consider extending his contract. We find that in fact due consideration was given to this and in spite of a favourable recommendation having been made, the All India Institute of Medical Sciences did not find it appropriate or necessary to continue with his services on a contractual basis. We do not find any arbitrariness in the view taken by the concerned authorities and therefore reject this contention of the petitioner.

7. We are also in agreement with the view expressed by the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the decision of this Court in Uma Devi. There is nothing on record to indicate that the appointment of the petitioner on a contractual basis or on an ad hoc basis was made in accordance with any regular procedure or by following the necessary rules. That being so, no right accrues in favour of the petitioner for regularisation of his services. The decision in Uma Devi does not advance the case of the petitioner.

8. Insofar as the final submission of the petitioner to the effect that some persons were appointed as Technical Assistant (ENT) in May 2016 is concerned, we are of the view that the events of 2016 cannot relate back to the events of 2010 when a decision was taken by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences not to extend the contract of the petitioner. The situation appears to have changed over the last six years and the petitioner cannot take any advantage of the changed situation. There is no material on record to indicate what caused the change in circumstances, and merely because there was a change in circumstances, does not mean that the petitioner is entitled to any benefit. On the other hand, it might have been more appropriate for the petitioner to have participated in the walk in interview so that he could also be considered for appointment as Technical Assistant (ENT), but he chose not to do so.