Cr.P.C. does not provide any provision for service of summons through Whatsapp

Going by Section 65 of Cr.P.C, if service could not be effected as provided under Section 62, the serving officer shall affix one of the duplicates of the summons to the conspicuous part of the house or homestead in which the person summoned ordinarily resides. Thereafter, the court should make such enquiries as it thinks fit and either declare the summons to have been duly served or order fresh service in such manner as it considers proper. As per Rule 7 of the Criminal Rules of Practice, Kerala, summons issued to the accused and witnesses shall ordinarily be signed by the Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court and the words “By order of the Court” shall invariably be prefixed to the signature of the Ministerial Officer. [Para No.3]

    The above provisions do not provide for service of summons through WhatsApp.

No doubt, the revolutionary changes in the field of communication calls for a more pragmatic approach regarding the mode and manner of service of summons. In this regard, it may be pertinent to note the insertion of Section 144 in the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, 'the Act') for the purpose of overcoming the delay in serving summons on the accused in complaints under Section 138 of the Act. Section 144, providing for service of summons by speed post or by approved courier service, was inserted by Act 55 of 2002.[Para No.4]

Judicial discretion cannot be so liberally exercised as to condone the delay where no cause is made out or the cause ascribed is unworthy of acceptance

The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one

    A profitable reference in this context can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and others, 2010(8) Supreme Court Cases 685, wherein after adverting to a number of precedents, including the judgment in the case of Perumon Bhagwathy Devaswom (supra), the Supreme Court cautioned against construing the provisions of the Order XXII of the Code and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in such a manner as to render them redundant and inoperative.[Para No.17]

    The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 32 to 35 and 38 are instructive. They read asunder:

“32. It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly.

    Furthermore, it is also a well settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to the provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. Once the legislature has enacted the provisions of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of such an application, all these provisions have to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law.

34. Liberal construction of the expression ‘sufficient cause' is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the Court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the Court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect “sufficient cause” as understood in law. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition 1997).

35. The expression “sufficient cause” implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word “sufficient” means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated.

36…………………………………………………………….

37…………………………………………………………….

38. Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this,the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The 

statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi-benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay in the filing of such applications.”[Para No.18]