Testamentary disposition by Will is not a 'transfer' as defined u/s.5 of the Transfer of Property Act

It is not necessary to obtain a probate in respect of properties which are not situated whithin the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay

    In view of the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, it will be necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Ceiling Act and the Succession Act. Section 29 of the Ceiling Act reads thus:-

"Section 29. (1) Without the previous sanction of the Collector, no land granted under Section 27 or granted to a joint farming society under Section 28 shall be -

(a) transferred, whether by way of sale (including sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or of an award or order of any competent authority) or by way of gift, mortgage, exchange, lease or otherwise; or

(b) divided whether by partition or otherwise, and whether by a decree or order of a Civil Court or any other competent authority, such sanction shall not be given otherwise than in such circumstances, and on such conditions including condition regarding payment of premium or nazarana to the State Government, as may be prescribed;

    Provided that, no such sanction shall be necessary where land is to be leased by a serving member of the armed forces or where the land is to be mortgaged as provided in Sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the Code for raising a loan for effecting any improvement of such land.

(2) If sanction is given by the Collector to any transfer or division under Sub-section (1) subsequent transfer or division of land shall also be subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1).

(3) Any transfer or division of land, any acquisition thereof, in contravention of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall be invalid; and as a penalty therefor, any right, title and interest of the transferor and transferee in or in relation to such land shall, after giving him an opportunity to show cause, be forfeited by the Collector and shall without further assurance vest in the State Government."

    This Court in the aforesaid case of Vimlabai vs. State of Maharashtra, cited supra, after considering the judgments on the point, has held that the transfers which are by act of parties made inter vivos or a result of a decree or an order of the Court, Tribunal or Authority, are alone covered by the said term as defined in Explanation (2) of Section 8 of the Ceiling Act. This Court has further held that it will not include the testamentary dispositions of the property not made inter vivos. Thus, this Court has taken a view that a testamentary disposition by Will is not covered by the word 'transfer' as per the provisions of Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act. This Court has further while dealing with the certain provisions of the Ceiling Act has in unequivocal terms held that the transfer under the Ceiling Act would not include the testamentary disposition of the property not made inter vivos. In that view of the matter, insofar as the findings of the learned S. D. O. that the transfer is bad in law in view of provisions of Section 29(3) of the said Act is not sustainable in law.[Para No.6]

    The next question that arises is whether it is necessary to obtain a probate, so as to claim right as executor or legatee for the lands in question.[Para No.7]

    It would be appropriate to refer to certain provisions of the Succession Act. The relevant portion of Section 213 reads as under:-

"S. 213. Right as executor or legatee when established. - (1) No right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice, unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in India has granted probate of the will under which the right is claimed, or has granted letters of administration with the will or with a copy of an authenticated copy of the will annexed.

Death caused; without any premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, without taking any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, is not a murder

Admittedly, both the parties belonged to the same family and reside in the same campus and their relation was also not cordial due to property dispute. What is evident from the testimony of the PW-2 and PW-12 is that when the appellant was washing his face in the morning, the PW-2 (son of the deceased) initiated the quarrel by challenging the appellant to lodge complaint before the villagers for cutting their paddy, whereupon the appellant came out with the pistol and challenged the deceased to come out and also hurled abuses at him (deceased) and the deceased also came out and challenged him by saying as to why was he shouting and creating noise. From the testimony of the PW-12, it is also discernible that at the beginning when the PW-2 challenged the appellant for the previous incidence of cutting paddy, the appellant did not have the armed with him and in course of the exchange of words he came out with the pistol. From the above evidence, it has been established that the accused, who was a retired Air Force personnel having a licensed pistol shot the deceased in the heat of passion in course of sudden quarrel and as such it is difficult to say that the act of the appellant causing death of the deceased was pre-meditated. When evidently the appellant inflicted the injury causing death of the deceased without any pre-meditation and in the heat of passion during sudden quarrel, the appellant could not have been held liable for offence of murder. However, the facts and circumstances under which the appellant inflicted the injury causing death of the deceased, he shall be liable for committing an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC.[Para No.28]

    In Rajender Singh v. State of Haryana (supra) in a similar facts situation the Apex Court converted a conviction under Section 302 IPC to 304 IPC, held as under:

"19. Consequently, we are convinced that since the death of Suraj Mal and Shri Ram had occurred due to the firing resorted to as part of his self-defence, the same would amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, which was committed without any premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion

upon a sudden quarrel and that the offender did not take undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, which would normally fall under Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC. Consequently, at best, conviction of the appellant can only be under Part II of Section 304 IPC for which he could have been inflicted with a punishment of ten years. For the very same reason, the conviction imposed under Section 27 of the Arms Act cannot also be sustained. It is stated that the appellant is suffering the sentence in jail and has so far suffered eleven years. The conviction is modified into one under Section 304 Part II and the sentence already suffered by the appellant is held to be more than sufficient."[Para No.29]