Electronic Evidence obtained illegally - Petition for divorce u/s. 13(1)(ia) of The Hindu Marriage Act - CCTV footage recorded without knowledge of wife - In recording wife was found to be talking on phone with her lady friend in a manner derogatory and defamatory to the husband - Husband produced CD of this recording as the evidence in divorce proceeding - Wife in her written statements opposed that CD to be tampered with and inadmissible as it is procured in breach of her right of privacy - After this objection husband made an application to family court to get the genuineness of CD examined from Forensic Lab - Family allowed that application and the same challenged by wife before High Court
Can CCTV audio-video secretly recorded by a spouse be permitted to be used against other spouse in a matrimonial dispute? Held: In matrimonial dispute, secret recording is admissible in evidence if found to be relevant to the facts-in-issue; and the other party can initiate legal action action the party for adopting illegal means; but such action would not render the illegally obtained evidence inadmissible if it is otherwise relevant for the purpose of deciding the matrimonial dispute between the parties.
The sequitur to the aforesaid constitutional and legal landscape is that :
(a) The settled rule, purely from the standpoint of the law of evidence, is that evidence is admissible so long as it is relevant, regardless of how it is collected. Digressing from this settled position would have wide ramifications and consequences; and would be a serious hindrance to judicial proceedings across the board, in several foreseeable and unforeseeable ways. On the other hand, the possible misuse of this rule of evidence, particularly in the context of the right to privacy, can be addressed by prudent exercise of judicial discretion by a court not at the time of receiving evidence but at the time of using evidence at the stage of adjudication ;
How to prove photos and screenshot sent by one person to another? (Mode of proof)
Can snapshot of chat from a mobile handset be read in evidence without producing that mobile handset?
Matrimonial dispute - divorce sought by husband - Ground of adultery - Husband received photos, telephonic conversation and snapshot of chat between wife and her lover - Electronic evidence - Mode of proof - compliance to be made
Held: Witness produced certificate u/s.65B and deposed that he had taken the print outs from the mobile phone, deserves to be read in evidence.
Learned counsel for the wife contended that the photographs placed on the file as Annexures A-1 to A-8, do not stand duly proved on the record as required under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short 'the Act of 1872') and in support of this contention, he relied upon Anvar P.V. vs. P.K. Basheer and others, 2015(1) SCC (Civil) 27, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that "in case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., the same would be accompanied by the certificate in terms of Section 65B obtained at the time of taking the document, without which, the secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record, was inadmissible."[Para No.9]
However, we do not find this contention to be tenable because PW-4 Sunil Kumar, the photographer, tendered the original certificate under Section 65B of the Act of 1872 on the record as Ex.PW-4/A and he also specifically deposed that he had taken the print out of the photographs, i.e. Annexures A-1 to A-8, from the internal memory of the mobile phone brought to his shop by the husband. Moreover, in a subsequent verdict, as rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case titled as State by Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station, Bengaluru vs M. R Hiremath, 2019 (3) SCC (Cri) 109, it has been held while referring to the above- discussed observations, as made in Anvar P.V.'s case (supra), that :-
Refusal by Hindu-wife to wear 'sindoor' and preventing husband performing duties towards his parents; is cruelty against husband.
Upon due perusal of the judgment it is seen that the discussion of the court below does not refer to certain pertinent evidences, which were brought before the Court by the contesting parties while adducing evidences. As discussed above, it is not disputed by the respondent wife that there was indeed an agreement entered into by and between the appellant husband and the respondent wife whereby the appellant was required to provide separate accommodation to the respondent wife in a rented house away from the matrimonial house and that the appellant's family members were not to be permitted to come and visit them. The respondent wife categorically admitted in her cross- examination about the presence of the said clause in the said agreement. It is also seen from the evidence that the respondent had filed another case before Digboi Police Station being Digboi P.S. Case No.230/2013, under Sections 471/420 IPC pending before the SDJM, Margherita, District Tinsukia wherein, it was submitted at the bar that charge sheet has been filed against the petitioner and other accused. PW1/appellant also adduced in his evidence that the respondent had refused to wear 'sakha and sindoor' any more. Such statement was not confronted to the appellant during the cross-examination, and accordingly, the same remained uncontroverted and is therefore an evidence material for the purpose of this proceedings. Under the custom of Hindu Marriage, a lady who has entered into marriage according to Hindu rituals and customs, and which has not been denied by the respondent in her evidence, her refusal to wear ' sakha and sindoor' will project her to be unmarried and/or signify her refusal to accept the marriage with the appellant. Such categorical stand of the respondent points to the clear intention of the respondent that she is unwilling to continue her conjugal life with the appellant. Under such circumstances compelling the appellant husband to continue to be in matrimony with the respondent wife may be construed to be harassment inflicted by the respondent upon the appellant and his family members.
This evidence although available before the Family Court during the evidence adduced, was not taken into account during the discussion in the impugned judgment. As such the Family Court erred in evaluating the evidence in the proper perspective. During the course of hearing it was submitted at the bar that the criminal proceedings pursuant to filing of Digboi P.S. Case No.159/2013, under Section 498(A) IPC against the appellant has been dismissed as the informant, namely the respondent wife was not pursuing the said proceeding. As such the allegation of subjecting the respondent wife to cruelty was not sustained. Such acts of lodging criminal cases on unsubstantiated allegations against the husband and/or the husband's family members amounts to cruelty as held by the Supreme Court. In this context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment being Rani Narasimha Sastri vs. Rani Suneela Rani, 2019 SCC Online SC 1595 has held that filing of criminal cases like case under Sections 498(A) IPC etc. against the husband and the family members and which are subsequently dismissed/rejected by the Family Court, is sufficient to be construed as an act of cruelty by the wife. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:.....[Para No.15]
Arbitration proceeding - Counter claim by respondent - counter claim dismissed - Award challenged u/s. 34 in District Court - District Court set aside that dismissal-award - consequences of such decision:
Held:
The Court which exercises jurisdiction u/s. 34 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not a court of first appeal under the provisions of the C.P.C. hence the setting aside of an arbitral award rejecting a claim/counter claim does not result in the claim/counter claim which was rejected by the Arbitrator being decreed as a result of the judgment of the court in a petition under Section 34 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
So, it follows that the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal ensures to the benefit of the petitioners being a successful party. It is the successful party who can seek its enforcement under Section 36 of the Act and also secure the Award under section 9 of the Act and not the respondent being the losing party. This position of law is well settled by the judgment of the Bombay High Court as upheld by the Supreme Court in case of Dirk (Supra) wherein in paragraphs 13 & 14, the Court has held as under:
Medical evidence Vs. oral evidence: which evidence has to be accepted?
Thus, the position of law in cases where there is a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular evidence can be crystallised to the effect, that though the ocular testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence, when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, that becomes a relevant factor in the process of the evaluation of evidence. However, where the medical evidence goes so far that it completely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved.
40.In the instant case as referred to hereinabove, as many as five assailants attacked one person but the prosecution case from the very inception of FIR, is very clear that accused-appellant Darshan Pasi shot fire when the deceased was sitting under the tree, causing him injury on chest and left palm, Lachiman Pasi and Sahai Pasi fired on his neck and skull inside boundary wall and Maharaj Deen and Gaya Prasad assaulted the deceased with banka. This fact is categorically substantiated by P.W.-1 in his oral testimony. The postmortem report reveals no firearm injury, either on neck or skull or any other part of the dead body, whereas remaining injuries relate to sharp edged weapon, which may be attributed to alleged use of banka by Maharaj Deen and Gaya Prasad.
Necessary party to suit - Sec. 2 (s) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act - Scope of definition of Shared Houshold - House property is exclusively own by father-in-law - After marriage daughter-in-law started to live in that house with her husband - Daughter-in-law started harassing her in-laws - father-in-law asked his son to vacate the house - Son alongwith wife left the house - After sometime daughter-in-law came bake and forcibly entered in that house and refused to vacate the house - Father-in-law filed a suit for eviction against his daughter in law without impleading his son as defendant.
Is the son necessary party to eviction suit filed against daughter-in-law?
Does the property owned by in-laws; in which their son was permitted to live with his wife, falls under the definition of Shared Household as defined u/s.2(s) of PWDV Act?
Held:
In-laws can evict Daughter-in-law from their house without seeking decree of eviction against their son. House exclusively owned by in-laws is not Shared Houshold under PWDV Act. Daughter-in-law is merely a licensee.
Even if the order, impugned in the Writ Petition, is, as held by the learned Single Judge, a transfer order, it is well settled that transfer from one place to another is an incidence of service, and is made in the exigencies of administration. No person can claim that he should not be transferred from one place to another. No government servant has a legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place or at a place of his choice. (Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Damodar Prasad Pandey (2004) 12 SCC 299; Major General J.K. Bansal v. Union of India (2005) 7 SCC 227 ; Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath (2004) 4 SCC 245; National Hydroelectric Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Shri Bhagwan (2001) 8 SCC 574). Transfer of an employee, appointed to a particular cadre of transferable posts, is an incident of service and is made in administrative exigencies. No government servant has neither a legal right to be posted at any particular place nor any choice in the matter. Transfer is necessary in public interest and efficiency in public administration, and is, normally, not to be interfered with by Courts/Tribunals. (Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani (1989) 2 SCC 602; Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P (2003) 4 SCC 104).[Para No.7]
Failure to make payment of compensation payable under contract is not equal to breach of contract.
Paragraph 1103 of Halsbury's distinguishes between kinds of money payments. Damages, as dealt with earlier, are said to be distinguishable from debts and from a sum of money payable under a contractual liability to pay a sum on a given event. In fact, damages are sought to be distinguishable from compensation and from a penalty and from costs. In the present case, once we come to the conclusion that the amount awarded is not damages and for breach of contract, the petitioner-Niko has no case whatsoever to challenge the award. It will be also beneficial to consider Anson's on the Law of Contract, which, in Chapter 18, deals with actions to recover an agreed sum. The claim in that case was for a liquidated amount and the defendant was obliged under the contract to pay money. Although in that sense, it is said to be similar to specific performance, it is distinguishable and does not attract the same bar in law. The Law of Contract draws a clear distinction between a claim for an agreed sum and a claim for damages for breach of contract. The claimant need not prove loss where a claim is for payment of an agreed sum and remoteness of damages and mitigation of loss are irrelevant in such situations. In the instant case, the formula is meant to provide for such payment. The application of the formula is a matter which was before the tribunal and which the tribunal has considered. The formula was admittedly applicable being within the contractual scope and was not extraneously sourced. There is no question of any further proof of loss caused. [Para No.54]
Now, let us examine the decisions which have a bearing on the point in issue.
11. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh MANU/SC/0139/1977 : (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533 considering the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, it was held that at the stage of framing of charge it is not obligatory for the judge to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. At that stage, the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion, at the initial stage of framing of charge, is sufficient to frame the charge and in that event it is not open to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
12. In Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja MANU/SC/0266/1979 : (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038 : (1980) 1 SCR 323 a three-Judge Bench held that the Magistrate at the stage of framing charges had to see whether the facts alleged and sought to be proved by the prosecution prima facie disclose the commission of offence on general consideration of the materials placed before him by the investigating police officer. (emphasis supplied) Though in this case the specific question whether an accused at the stage of framing of charge has a right to produce any material was not considered as such, but that seems implicit when it was held that the Magistrate had to consider material placed before it by the investigating police officer.
13. In State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi MANU/SC/0649/2000 : (2000) 8 SCC 239 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1486 this Court reiterated that at the stage of framing of charge the trial court is not to examine and assess in detail the materials placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons.
14. In State of M.P. v. S.B. Johari MANU/SC/0025/2000 : (2000) 2 SCC 57 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 311 it was held that the charge can be quashed if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted, cannot show that the accused committed the particular offence. In that case, there would be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.
15. In State of Maharashtra v. Priya Sharan Maharaj MANU/SC/ 1146/1997 : (1997) 4 SCC 393 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 584 it was held that at Sections 227 and 228 stage the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may, for this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
16. All the decisions, when they hold that there can only be limited evaluation of materials and documents on record and sifting of evidence to prima facie find out whether sufficient ground exists or not for the purpose of proceeding further with the trial, have so held with reference to materials and documents produced by the prosecution and not the accused. The decisions proceed on the basis of settled legal position that the material as produced by the prosecution alone is to be considered and not the one produced by the accused. The latter aspect relating to the accused though has not been specifically stated, yet it is implicit in the decisions. It seems to have not been specifically so stated as it was taken to be a well-settled proposition. This aspect, however, has been adverted to in State Anti-Corruption Bureau v. P. Suryaprakasam 1999 SCC (Cri) 373 where considering the scope of Sections 239 and 240 of the Code it was held that at the time of framing of charge, what the trial court is required to, and can consider are only the police report referred to under Section 173 of the Code and the documents sent with it. The only right the accused has at that stage is of being heard and nothing beyond that.[Para No.10]
11. Thus it is settled position of law that at the time of framing of charge, the Court is not supposed to look into the evidence of the case in detail and is only to consider whether there is a strong suspicion against the accused on the basis of the material that comes before it. The court has the power to sift the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out, whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused. However, the Court is not supposed to delve deeply into the merits of the matter and start a roving expedition into the evidence that is brought forth it, as if conducting a trial. Further there is no one fixed definition that may be ascribed to the term prima facie' nor can the term strong suspicion have a singular meaning. While coming to the conclusion of a strong prima facie case or strong suspicion, the Court shall have to decide each case on the basis of its own independent facts and circumstances.[Para No.11]
26. It is trite law that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is not to delve deeply with the evidence brought forth, but the same does not mean that the Court should ignore gaping holes apparent on the face of the record, in the case of the prosecution, and the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution.[Para No.26]
Held: If the version of witness is unassailable, capable of being accepted for its face value without any hesitation then such witness is called as Sterling Witness.
Whether consent of mother is necessary to alienate property of minor?
Whether father is required permission of District Court for alienating property of minor?
Grand mother gave property to minor grandson as a gift - Father without consent of mother of minor and without permission of court executed agreement to sale with third-party - before execution of sale deed, minor attained majority - Notice for specific performance of agreement given to the owner who has attained the majority - suit for specific performance filed against owner who was minor at the time of execution of agreement to sale by his father - Trial court hold that father of the minor was the legal guardian, however, he did not have the authority to execute the agreement, as the defacto guardian was the mother - Suit dismissed - First appellate court reversed the judgment of trial court - Second appeal filed in High Court.
Held: Under Mohammedan Law the mother cannot act or be the guardian of the property of the minor. Consent or permission neither of mother nor of District Court is necessary for father, being natural guardian to alienate property of minor.
There can be no conviction on the basis of surmises and conjectures or suspicion howsoever grave it may be. Strong suspicion, strong coincidences and grave doubt cannot take the place of legal proof.
In para 14 of its judgment Hon'ble Supreme court in case of Digamber Vaishnav and another vs State of Chandigarh (2019) 4 SCC 522, has held as under:
"14. One of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence is undeniably that the burden of proof squarely rests on the prosecution and that the general burden never shifts. There can be no conviction on the basis of surmises and conjectures or suspicion howsoever grave it may be. Strong suspicion, strong coincidences and grave doubt cannot take the place of legal proof. The onus of prosecution can't be discharged by referring to very strong suspicion and existence of highly suspicious factors to inculpate the accused nor falsity of defence could take the place of proof which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed, though a false plea by the defence at best, be considered as an addition circumstance if other circumstances unfailingly point to the guilt."
Divorce by mutual consent - Wife agreed not to claim any maintenance including Streedhan, husband assured to continued marrital relationship and maintain her- Husband and wife continued their marrital relationship inspite of paper decree of divorce - After some years husband discontinued this relationship and not made any arrangement for maintenance of wife who has been divorced by him - Wife claimed maintenance u/s.125 of CrPC - Husband's defence that she had given up her claim for maintenance, when the decree for divorce by mutual consent was passed; and she has income source as she is running a beauty parlour.
Held:
A woman after divorce becomes destitute. If she cannot maintain herself and remains unmarried, the man who was once her husband continues to be under a duty and obligation to provide maintenance to her.[Para No.20]
What has to be considered while deciding framing of charge against accessed?
It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of framing of charge, Magistrate can sift the evidence for limited purpose. Detailed scrutiny is not to be done. Prosecution story need not be accepted as gospel truth. If the charge is found to be groundless, then the Magistrate on consideration of the police report and the documents and making such examination as deemed appropriate, may discharge the accused, but if there is ground to presume that accused has committed an offence, the charge can be framed. The basic concept is that the Court has to see the prima facie nature of the case at the time of framing of charge. Broad probability of the case can be considered. Following principles are to be kept in mind at the time of framing of charge:-
So far as the order dated 04.02.2016 is concerned, cognizance of the offence was taken and the accused were directed to face trial by way of issuing summons.
It is settled law that such orders are revisable orders as they adversely affect the right of the accused. Revision would lie against such order.[Para No.5 and 6]
Importance of putting defence story in cross examination of witness - No suggestion is given to witness in the cross examination about the story put forwarded by accused in his statement u/s.313 of Cr.P.C.
Held:
When the defence did not put any question to the witness in the cross-examination on a material point, it cannot subsequently raise any grievance on such point. When it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a point, it is absolutely essential to direct his attention to the disputed facts and grant him opportunity to offer his explanation on that point. It is a settled legal proposition that in case the question is not put to the witness in cross-examination who could furnish explanation on a particular issue, the correctness or legality of the said fact/issue could not be raised.
[Para No.19]
It is settled law that FIR is not an encyclopedia of facts and it is not expected from a victim to give details of the incident either in the FIR or in the brief history given to the doctors. FIR is not an encyclopedia which is expected to contain all the details of the prosecution case; it may be sufficient if the broad facts of the prosecution case alone appear.[Para No.15]
What is the status of transaction and purchaser of property during the pendency of suit?
It is settled legal position that the effect of Section 52 is not to render transfers effected during to pendency of a suit by a party to the suit void, but only to render such transfers subservient to the rights of the parties to such suit, as may be, eventually, determined in the suit. In other words, the transfer remains valid subject, of course, to the result of the suit. The pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to, or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor as may be eventually determined by the court. The mere pendency of the suit does not prevent one of the parties to the suit from dealing with the subject matter of the suit. The Section only postulates a condition that the lis pendens alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree, which may be passed in the suit unless the property alienated with the permission of the Court.
