Showing posts with label muslim law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label muslim law. Show all posts

26 July 2020

Party who rely on existence of a custom, must plead and prove the same

It can be concluded from the above discussion that a person claiming a customary right to succeed to the office of mutawalli would have to show that the waqif intended for the office to devolve through a practice of hereditary succession. In the absence of any express directions in the waqfnama to this effect, the claimant would have to show that such practice has been in existence throughout the history of the trust, and not merely for a few generations, such that the waqif’s intention that the office should be hereditary can be presumed. The burden of proof would be higher with respect to a public waqf, such as the suit waqf in the instant case, than a family trust.[Para No.22]

Party who rely on existence of a custom, must plead and prove the same
   We may now consider what the principles governing the establishment of a custom under Muslim law are. It is a settled position of law that a custom in order to be legal and binding must be certain, reasonable and acted upon in practice for a long period with such invariability and continuity that it has become the established governing rule in a community by common consent. It is equally settled that it is incumbent upon the party relying on the custom to plead and prove it.
   In this regard, we may fruitfully refer to the following observations from Fyzee’s Outlines of Muhammedan Law (5th edn., 2008, Prof. Tahir Mahmood ed., p. 49) (for short “Fyzee”):
“First, the burden lies heavily upon the person who asserts to plead the custom relied upon and prove clearly that he is governed by custom and not by the general law. Secondly, as to the proof of custom, there is in law no presumption in favour of custom and the custom must be ancient, certain and not opposed to public policy.” (emphasis supplied) The leading case with respect to the requirements of proving a custom is the decision of the Privy Council in H.H. Mir Abdul Hussein Khan v. Bibi Sona Dero, AIR 1917 PC 181.

19 June 2020

Divorced Muslim woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her husband

Muslim divorced wife - entitlement of maintenance - sec.125 of CrPC - Sec. 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 - jurisdiction and power of family court to convert an application filed u/s.125 of CrPC into an application u/s. 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

Held: A divorced Muslim woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her husband after the enactment of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women. However, under Section 3  read with Section 4 of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women, a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to an order of maintenance, if she is unable to maintain herself after the Iddat period and has not remarried.

Family Court would have jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act to entertain an application under Section 3 and 4 if The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

It is now settled that a divorced Muslim woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her husband after the enactment of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women. However, under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women, a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to an order of maintenance, if she is unable to maintain herself after the Iddat period and has not remarried. Section 5 of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women provides that a divorced woman and her former husband might decide by an affidavit or any other declaration in writing, that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions of Section 125 to 128 of the Cr.P.C.[Para No.56]

Divorced Muslim woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her husband

Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is an enabling provision which enables a divorced Muslim woman to make an application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of maintenance or mehr or dower or delivery of properties, as the case may be. The non- obstante clause is restricted to sub-section (1) of Section 3 and does not cover sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the 1986 Act for Muslim Women. There is no conflict between Section 3(2) of the 1986 Act for Muslim women and the Family Courts Act. On the other hand, Section 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 gives overriding effect to the Family Courts Act notwithstanding anything therewith contained in any other law in force. The Family Court is to exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any other subordinate Civil court in respect of a proceeding for maintenance.

06 June 2020

Muslim mother is not guardian of minor's property

  • Whether consent of mother is necessary to alienate property of minor?

  • Whether father is required permission of District Court for alienating property of minor?
   Grand mother gave property to minor grandson as a gift - Father without consent of mother of minor and without permission of court executed agreement to sale with third-party - before execution of sale deed, minor attained majority - Notice for specific performance of agreement given to the owner who has attained the majority - suit for specific performance filed against owner who was minor at the time of execution of agreement to sale by his father - Trial court hold that father of the minor was the legal guardian, however, he did not have the authority to execute the agreement, as the defacto guardian was the mother - Suit dismissed - First appellate court reversed the judgment of trial court - Second appeal filed in High Court.

Held: Under Mohammedan Law the mother cannot act or be the guardian of the property of the minor. Consent or permission neither of mother nor of District Court is necessary for father, being natural guardian to alienate property of minor.
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